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ABSTRACT 
In the context of violent crimes and criminal investigations, the effectiveness and 
proven success of offender or criminal profiling have been well documented. In 
reference to white-collar crime perpetrators offenders, this is a much less 
documented topic though. 
 
For any organisation to function effectively and be profitable there is huge reliance 
placed on employees. There is an expectation that the employees will carry out their 
functions with honesty and integrity while having the employer’s best interests in 
mind. Recent local and international published fraud surveys reported widely on the 
growing trend that has become known as the insider threat. This trend relates to the 
actual occurrence of misconduct by staff members and has increased proportionally 
over the years, i.e. from 55% in 2010 to a staggering 81% in 2015. The aim of this 
research was to determine how to profile staff members who commit white-collar 
crime in the South African short-term insurance industry. In addition, this research 
also focused on an introduction on the South African short-term insurance industry, 
as well as the suggested sources to consider when profiling staff as potential white-
collar criminal perpetrators and the importance of making use of crime linkage 
analysis. 
 
Results of this research include that the main objective of profiling will at all times 
be to perform a structured social and psychological assessment of the perpetrator 
and when conducting the profiling of potential white-collar criminal perpetrators, 
there are specific offender characteristics to consider, and detailed data will be 
required pertaining to certain categories.  
 
KEY TERMS 
Fraud, fraud risk management, fraud triangle, profiling, red flags, short-term 
insurance, white-collar crime 
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1. CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL ORIENTATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Costing South Africa an estimated R930 million a year, commercial and 
white-collar crime is on the rise in South Africa – especially among senior 
to top management. Internal crime is one of the most serious threats to 
the stability of a company, and despite employers’ efforts to secure 
assets, the occurrence of these incidents is increasing. This type of crime 
does not necessarily occur instantaneously, but often it is a gradual 
process that, if done meticulously, may only be discovered at a later stage 
coinciding with irreversible financial damage. The rise in white-collar 
cases, coupled with low conviction rate, is placing the insurance industry 
under increasing pressure (Risk Benefit Solutions, 2014:1). 
 
The researcher knows from experience, first as an internal auditor, and providing 
assistance in intelligence and analytics in investigative matters during the past 
thirteen years, that there are five (5) main categories of perpetrators as currently 
defined from a South African short-term insurance industry perspective, namely: 
 
 Policyholders (clients) 
 Suppliers 
 Intermediaries (brokers) 
 No specific relationship (n/r’s) 
 Staff (employees)  
 
This research focused only on understanding the profiling of staff as white-collar 
crime perpetrators. Since this research focused mainly on white-collar crime from 
an internal perspective (i.e. staff) in the South African short-term insurance industry 
and not insurance fraud in general, it is important to take note of the estimated 
annual loss due to fraud as being 5% of annual revenues, (Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2012:8). There have been several cases where insurers 
suffered huge financial losses due to various types of white-collar crime being 
committed by staff. Often these are not individual staff members that commit white-
collar crime, but a number of staff members that work together.  
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Once such example during 2015 led to extensive business disruption at a major 
South African short-term insurance firm while the investigation was in progress, and 
a number of staff across various levels of management had to be suspended 
(Moneyweb, 2015:1).  
 
From informal discussions at conferences and industry networking sessions, the 
researcher came to the realisation that in specific-to-staff (employee) investigative 
matters in the South African short-term insurance industry, most of the emphasis is 
on transactional analysis and only for finding proof or applicable evidence. Very little 
thought or consideration is currently given to the potential use of profiling from either 
an investigative or proactive white-collar crime perspective.  
 
This research has therefore been undertaken in order to understand what profiling 
entails. In addition, this research includes a critical assessment of the suggested 
steps to follow when profiling staff (employees) who commit white-collar crime in 
the South African short-term insurance industry. 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH (PROBLEM STATEMENT)  
Mouton (2001:53) states that real-life problems ask questions based on observation 
or experiences instead of theory or logic, and he adds that research involves 
collecting information. The analysis and interpretation of the detail collected will 
subsequently take place. Leedy and Ormrod (2010:44) are, however, of the opinion 
that the research problem could be considered the heart of any research and must 
be stated precisely and plainly. 
 
The researcher, during the past thirteen years, while providing intelligence and 
analytical assistance in support of investigative matters at her employer in the short-
term insurance industry, found that understanding the profile of a white-collar 
perpetrator is an additional and often invaluable tool for the investigator. This deeper 
understanding could potentially be beneficial in the implementing of proactive 
strategies to prevent a recurrence of the related white-collar crime. Understanding 
the profile of a typical white-collar crime perpetrator in the South African short-term 
insurance industry could provide additional valuable insight when recruiting staff, in 
order to prevent future white-collar crime.  
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Staff play a pivotal role in the operations of the South African short-term insurance 
industry in order to deliver service and assistance when a policyholder suffers a 
loss. The further issue that short-term insurance is not a tangible product and is 
based on trust means that all staff throughout the South African short-term 
insurance industry must display the highest degree of integrity at all times.  
 
The South African short-term insurance industry is a highly regulated industry, 
which means that the various insurers must ensure that they employ the correct 
calibre staff, since failure to do so could result in the loss of consumer trust or 
business, or even the imposition of fines by various regulatory bodies. Regulatory 
bodies particularly applicable to the South African short-term insurance include the 
Financial Services Board (FSB), which fulfils the role of registrar of insurance, as 
defined in the Short-term Insurance Act, 1998.  
 
A South African insurer, in addition, has to be a registered South African public 
company, or alternatively, a registered Lloyd’s Underwriter, and in all instances has 
to operate in accordance with an active Financial Services Provider (FSP) license, 
known in general terminology as the FSP license number. It is furthermore required 
that all intermediaries (brokers), as well as all individuals providing financial services 
advice are authorised to perform these duties, as specified under the regulatory 
provisions of Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (FAIS), 2002 
(Dinnie, Bracher & Rodriques, 2013:1). 
 
A scan of available literary sources indicated that there is limited knowledge within 
the South African short-term insurance industry on how to profile staff as potential 
perpetrators of white-collar crime. The researcher observed potential weaknesses 
from a short-term insurance industry point of view when serving on a sub-committee 
of the South African Insurance Crime Bureau (SAICB). During the terms served, the 
researcher noticed that only staff names, surnames and, in limited instances, 
identity numbers of perpetrators employed in the South African short-term insurance 
industry were collected and shared among member companies. The lack of further 
meaningful data accompanying the circulation of the alleged staff perpetrator detail 
resulted in a less effective exercise and limited overall results.  
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The SAICB was founded in September 2008 as a sub-committee of the South 
African Insurance Association (SAIA). The SAICB was established with the overall 
purpose of assisting the South African short-term insurance industry with the 
detection and investigation of organised short-term insurance crime.  
Following a strategic session in June 2017, the SAICB decided to re-brand and will 
in future be known only as the Insurance Crime Bureau (ICB). Therefore, it will be 
referred to as ICB in this research. On 2 October 2017, the ICB had their official re-
launch, and extensive coverage in the media subsequently followed (COVER, 
2017:1).  
1.3 AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Kothari (2004:3), when basic research is conducted, the aim could be 
defined as collating information that has an extensive number of applications and in 
the process contributes to already available research. The aim of this research is to 
determine how to profile staff members who commit white-collar crime in the South 
African short-term insurance industry. 
 
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
Creswell (2009:111) stated that the purpose of a research proposal is most 
important, since it summarises and condenses the overall study to a few sentences. 
Babbie (2010:17) is further of the opinion that the purpose of research could be 
explanatory or exploratory. If the research is conducted from an explanatory 
perspective, it strives to provide reasons for everyday trends or “phenomena.” 
General answers may often be available for such trends, but such answers may not 
necessarily be trustworthy, therefore additional research may be deemed 
necessary. On the flip side, should the research being conducted take on more of 
an exploratory angle, it helps to define a specific topic that might evolve into further 
future studies, or could merely assist in dispelling typical “misconceptions” about 
the specific topic being explored as part of the research. 
 
Although the description by Denscombe (2002:26), for the purpose of research, 
aligns with that of Creswell (2009:111), definite focus areas as part of any research 
proposal are advised. These suggested focus areas to be considered are 
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“evaluation, exploration, application and empowerment.” The researcher 
incorporated these four suggested areas throughout this research, and below is 
more detail of how this was achieved. 
1.4.1 Evaluation 
The researcher studied available detail in respect of a number of staff-specific 
matters that had been investigated at the largest South African short-term insurer. 
On the one hand, this was useful for identifying typical data field descriptions that 
may have to be noted or captured when investigating staff that commit white-collar 
crime anywhere in the South African short-term insurance industry, while in addition 
it also helped the researcher to identify crucial “missing” data field descriptions that 
are required to complete related profiling steps. In addition, it highlighted important 
additional data field descriptions that had to be included but that the researcher had 
previously missed.  
1.4.2 Exploration 
From an explorative research perspective, the researcher reviewed available local 
and international research literature in order to understand the suggested steps that 
must be taken when conducting profiling. Due to the limited information available 
regarding the profiling of staff as perpetrators, and the value it could contribute to 
the prevention of white-collar crime, the researcher embarked on this research in 
order to profile staff as white-collar crime perpetrators in the short-term insurance 
industry.  
1.4.3 Application 
Relying on past experience, the researcher identified a growing need in the short-
term insurance industry regarding the use of profiling for staff that commit white-
collar crime. The researcher therefore strove to establish a suggested best practice 
for profiling staff that commit white-collar crime throughout the short-term insurance 
industry. Further potential benefits from a preventive or proactive white-collar crime-
fighting angle may follow from this research. 
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1.4.4 Empowerment  
By conducting this research, the researcher aimed for an improved overall 
understanding of what profiling entails, as well as a critical assessment of the 
suggested steps to follow when profiling staff committing white-collar crime in the 
short-term insurance industry. Once this research has been approved, the results 
gathered will be shared throughout the short-term insurance industry in South 
Africa. The future sharing will take place by means of contact with various 
stakeholders and industry bodies such as the ICB, networking sessions, as well as 
conferences. Sharing could benefit white-collar crime investigation strategies for the 
entire South African short-term insurance industry. 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Kothari (2004:15) explains that research objectives could be defined as the relevant 
steps to get “answers to questions, through the application of scientific procedures.” 
This author emphasises that research is aimed at what has not been uncovered yet, 
and that research objectives could mostly be grouped into the following four 
categories: 
 
 Exploratory or formative research studies – when attempting to achieve new 
insight. 
 Descriptive research studies – when providing accurate feedback regarding the 
characteristics of a particular individual, situation or a group. 
 Diagnostic research studies - to report back on the frequency at which something 
occurs. 
 Hypothesis-testing research studies – when testing for causal relationship 
between variables. 
 
The specific research objectives of this study are to: 
 
 Explore and describe the concept of profiling. 
 Determine the steps to be taken to profile staff committing white-collar crime in 
the short-term insurance industry. 
 
This research could contribute to a better understanding of white-collar crime 
perpetrators within specific organisations of employment in the South African short-
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term insurance industry. It is also foreseen that the research will represent an 
original contribution to the profiling of the perpetrators of white-collar crime. The 
data relating to historic investigative matters have been sourced from the 
researcher’s employer, which is the largest South African short-term insurer 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015:22). 
 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Creswell, Ebersöhn, Eloff, Ferreira, Ivankova, Jansen, Niewenhuis, Pietersen, 
Plano Clark and Van der Westhuizen (2007:33) assert that a good research 
question directs the researcher towards relevant literary sources, and provides 
focus for data collection. In addition, these authors state that the research questions 
eventually become the basis of the research for which a researcher strives to find 
answers. Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005:15) instead found that a useful way to 
identify research problems is to ask good questions, which consist of the following 
elements:  
 
 Describe relationship(s) between two or more variants. 
 Easy to understand, and clear on what is asked. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the researcher limited and focused the research on 
the following research questions: 
 
 What does profiling entail? 
 Which steps should be taken to profile employees committing white-collar crime 
in the short-term insurance industry? 
1.7 DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY 
The researcher is currently employed as the manager responsible for the team 
conducting data-mining and analytics, and providing intelligence assistance to the 
in-house investigation team at the largest short-term insurer in South Africa 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015:22). As part of their role, this team supports the in-
house forensic team in all investigative matters, with dedicated focus on internal 
staff matters, which include investigative cases across the African continent. For the 
purpose of this research, all non-South African internal investigative staff matters 
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have been excluded and do not form part of the final analysis of specific trends or 
potential areas for improvement. 
 
In addition to all the information collated as part of the literature review, the 
researcher has over the past thirteen years provided assistance in respect of 
forensic investigative matters in the South African short-term insurance industry 
from an intelligence and analytic perspective. Although five perpetrator groups form 
the basis of all the investigative matters in the industry, this research focused on the 
perpetrator group that consists of staff (employees). The research therefore focused 
on the internal white-collar crime perpetrator, from a South African short-term 
insurance perspective. 
1.8 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010:293) emphasise the fact that any term or key concept that 
has to be interpreted in a “specialised sense” throughout a research proposal must 
be defined to ensure that the “researcher and the reader have the same orientation.” 
Denscombe (2003:291) adds that key concepts act mainly as “identifiers” of these 
specific words, and capture the overall “essence” of the research. These keywords 
are most important when the researcher cross-references during library searches. 
The theoretical concepts described below therefore relate to the key components of 
this research.  
1.8.1 Short-term insurance 
In terms of the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998, it is stated that short-term 
insurance refers to the “business of providing or undertaking to provide policy 
benefits under short-term policies.” Furthermore, a short-term policy is defined as 
any of the following- “engineering policy, guarantee policy, liability policy, accident, 
health, property or transportation policy or a contract comprising a combination of 
any of these policies.” 
1.8.2 Profiling 
This is also often referred to as “criminal offender profiling,” and according to 
Padgett (2015:61) can be described as “collating various pieces of information and 
data or intelligence in reference to a crime or crime offender.” 
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1.8.3 White-collar crime 
As first described by Sutherland (1947:9), this is a crime “committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.” 
1.8.4 Red flags 
A red flag, or also often called “fraud warning signs,” can according to Padgett 
(2015:71) be described as “an event or set of circumstances, most often unusual in 
nature and that should alert an organization to the presence of risk.” 
1.8.5 Fraud  
The definition of fraud is defined as follows by Snyman (2002:520) “the unlawful and 
intentional making of a misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is 
potentially prejudicial to another.” 
1.8.6 Fraud triangle  
The fraud triangle was developed by Cressey (1973:30) and he explained that “three 
fundamentals” have to be in existence for there to be fraud. These are 
“incentive/pressure,” “opportunity,” and “rationalization.” 
1.8.7 Fraud risk management 
Fraud risk management can be described as “activities aimed at identifying and 
developing actions for the organization to reduce risks arising from the actual or 
potential cases of fraud (KPMG, 2010:2).” It most often includes a combination of 
the following components, namely “prevention; detection; response.” 
1.9 RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN  
Mouton and Marais (1996:32) describe research design as the alignment of the 
overall “research goal with the practical considerations and limitations of the 
project.” These authors further explain that the most important steps to consider 
from a research design perspective are the steps related to “design” and “plan.” 
These two steps will subsequently form the overall foundation of the research 
project in the end. Mouton and Marais (1996:33) emphasise that irrespective of 
whether a more “structured versus unstructured” approach is followed by the 
researcher, the most critical and decisive factor is constant, “rational decision 
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making.” These authors believe that rational decision-making is crucial for ensuring 
that valid results can be reported on throughout the process of conducting the 
research. 
 
Babbie (2010:24), on the other hand, is of the opinion that the difference in 
approaches could be linked back to “numerical” (quantitative) versus “non-
numerical” (qualitative) type of data. Babbie (2010:24) elaborates on the 
advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, and asserts that qualitative 
approach positives could include a deeper meaning, but then a potential negative 
could be the subsequent, mere “verbal description” only.  A qualitative approach 
may be described as a bottom-up method resulting in a theory being formed, based 
on the information that was gathered, additional knowledge that was obtained, and 
feedback that was received from participants. When data is collated as part of 
research, it is most important to ensure that it is explained within the context, and 
the “accuracy of findings” is confirmed (Creswell 2009:18). 
 
The researcher made use of a qualitative approach throughout this research, which 
has been exploratory in nature and aimed at determining how to profile staff who 
commit white-collar crimes in the South African short-term insurance industry. A 
non-empirical research design was applied throughout this research, and the 
researcher incorporated the non-empirical design type that is described as a 
“systematic review.” As explained by Gough, Oliver and Thomas (2012:2), 
systematic review can be described as “a review of research literature using 
systematic and explicit, accountable methods.” These authors warn that, although 
the concept of systematic reviews may be deemed “simple, but with a profound 
impact,” the difficulty in executing the reviews and the exact process for carrying out 
such have created much debate (Gough et al., 2012:7).  
 
The information required for the purpose of this qualitative research was obtained 
by combining a literature review, the researcher’s own experience gained, and 
knowledge sharing within the South African short-term insurance industry. The 
researcher as far as possible made use of information from primary data sources.  
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Due to the files pertaining to staff investigative matters forming the basis of this 
qualitative research, the data was collected and analysed from this secondary data 
source.  
1.10 POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
1.10.1 Population 
In the opinion of Richie and Lewis (2003:86), a researcher must first define the so-
called “parent population,” regardless of the number of units of analysis. This then 
represents the overall population when a sample has to be selected. These authors 
suggest that three crucial questions have to be asked in order to define the 
population for a research study (Richie & Lewis, 2003:87). These questions must 
flow from the research question, and are defined below. If they are not assessed 
properly, they may have an influence on the eventual outcome of the research: 
 
 It must be confirmed whether a certain “group or sub-population is of central 
interest to the research.” 
 Due to the prevalence of certain scenarios or experiences, one has to establish 
whether any specific “sub-sets of the population need to be excluded.” 
 It must also be ascertained whether any additional sub-populations need to be 
included.  
 
For the purpose of this qualitative research study, the parent population was 
identified as the available and relevant 326 investigative files pertaining to staff that 
had committed white-collar crime at the largest short-term insurer. The files that 
formed the parent population represented staff investigative matters pertaining to 
white-collar crime transgressions covering the period 2003 until 2016, and 
specifically in the South African short-term insurance industry. These staff 
investigative matters consist of closed files, of which the internal investigations have 
been completed, but the criminal prosecution may still be in process, since the 
finalisation of criminal prosecution can on average take up to five (5) years. Written 
permission was obtained from the employer of the researcher via the Head: Group 
Internal Audit and Group Business Integrity. The relevant letter of permission is 
attached as Annexure A.  
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1.10.2 Sampling 
Maree (2007:79) describes sampling as the “process used to select a portion of the 
population” for the research proposal. The author differentiates between “non-
probability” and “purposive” sampling. The latter refers to when “participants are 
selected because of some defining characteristics.” Such criteria mean that these 
participants are “holders of the data” needed for the research proposal. Maree 
(2007:80) further explains that due to the lack of “random selection of population 
elements,” it is advisable to not make use of “non-probability” sampling when 
conducting research. The opinions of the authors Bachman and Schutt 
(2014:108-109) differ and they explain that there are two (2) sampling 
methodologies that should be considered. These are: 
 
 Probability 
 Non-probability 
 
The first of the sampling methodologies refers to when the probability of the chosen 
population elements has not yet been identified. As part of this research, the method 
of non-probability sampling was selected and incorporated throughout. Bachman 
and Schutt (2014:109) also assert that purposive sampling is another known non-
probability technique that can be used when selecting a sample, and Lanier and 
Briggs (2014:206) emphasise that for non-probability sampling, no action in the 
form of random selection need be applied when choosing a research sample.  
 
This qualitative research did not deal with specific individuals; instead, data was 
obtained from the relevant staff investigative files and in accordance with the 
“purposive sampling method,” covering the period 2003 to 2016. All the staff 
investigative matters were South African-specific, totalling 326 files that 
subsequently formed the base data set of this research. The 326 staff investigative 
files analysed for this study consisted of the following list of misconduct categories 
which are categorised by the specific short-term insurance company as white-collar 
criminal transgressions: 
 
 
 
13 
 Misconduct - Company policy   68 
 Misconduct – Code of ethics  34 
 Misconduct – HR policies  33 
 Bribery or Kickbacks  24 
 Fraud (include false 3rd party and EFT payments)  21 
 Misconduct – IT policy  20 
 False Claims   20 
 Theft – Company property (include salvage, premiums & petty cash)  17 
 Abuse of company resources (exclude company credit card and tool of 
trade vehicle) 
 10 
 False claims information   8 
 Theft (at previous employer or at 3rd party service provider)  7 
 N/R’s (no direct relation perpetrator)  7 
 Misconduct –intermediary (broker related)  6 
 Failure to disclose conflict of interest    6 
 Disclosing confidential company information  5 
 Failure to disclose previous criminal conviction  4 
 False underwriting / manipulation of underwriting stats  4 
 Dishonesty   4 
 Abuse pertaining to company credit card spend   3 
 Substance abuse (i.e. narcotics) offences  3 
 Corruption   3 
 Inflated Claims   3 
 Sexual harassment offences  3 
 Driving under the influence  3 
 Gross negligence matters  2 
 Accessing sexual explicit material (pornography)  2 
 Moonlighting   1 
 Nepotism  1 
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 Cyber-crime offence (include attempting hacking)   1 
 False sick note information provided  1 
 Forgery  1 
 Plagiarism  1 
 
The researcher purposively selected a base data set that covered a thirteen-year 
period, based on the following rationale: 
 
 Coverage of staff investigative matters applicable to all job-grade levels in the 
organisation was covered. Since white-collar crime investigative matters are 
more complicated when involving senior management, these cases could take 
longer to be completed, and the subsequent criminal prosecution could take an 
additional period of three (3) to five (5) years.  
 The purposively selected 326 files relating to staff who had committed white-
collar crime in the South African short-term insurance industry, and forming the 
base data set of this research, were closed files, with the internal investigations 
having been completed, but the criminal prosecution may still be on-going.  
 Available data covering more than ten (10) years were included in this research 
and could be beneficial when potential future concerns are addressed that the 
base data set covered only a short or limited period. 
 The available data covering more than ten (10) years, as included in this 
research, ensured potentially increased coverage of information pertaining to the 
outcome of the South African Police Service (SAPS) criminal matters, where 
applicable, due to the extensive time that criminal prosecution may take prior to 
finalisation and sentencing. 
 The overall base data set, together with the thirteen-year period of coverage, 
ensure that white-collar criminal transgressions are all included in accordance 
with changing legislation, as well as regulatory and governance reforms. This 
combination therefore lessens the possibility of trends being skewed or already 
deemed outdated by potential critics of this research. 
 This selected base data and period of coverage will ensure that available data 
applicable to internal white-collar crime perpetrators are analysed in reference 
to their involvement from both an opportunistic and an organised crime 
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perspective, since in the earlier years, staff committed white-collar crime more 
often from their own initiative, while in recent years they are more likely to have 
been approached by syndicates.  
 
The researcher has in addition selected only South African-based staff investigative 
matters, since this research specifically focused on the South African short-term 
insurance.  
 
A hard-copy file is available for each of the investigative matters at either of the two 
offices based in Cape Town and Johannesburg. Investigative files older than twelve 
months are indexed, scanned and safely stored at a company specialising in 
document warehousing. All relevant details from staff investigative files are 
captured electronically on a continuous basis. The electronic database being used 
for this purpose is the E-solve application. Various readily available, automated 
reports are available to enable extraction of all captured data fields. These reports 
are run from BI (Business Information) and Qlikview platforms but can be extracted 
into other standard applications such as Ms Excel or Adobe Acrobat (PDF). In 
alignment with the aim of this research and the research questions as defined, the 
following fields have been identified as crucial from an accuracy and completeness 
perspective for purposes of this qualitative research:  
 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Marital status 
 Highest level of education 
 Job-grade level in the organisation at the time of the investigation 
 Specific department of employment in the organisation at the time of the 
investigation 
 Years of service 
 Previous employer (if applicable) 
 Manner in which the white-collar crime detail was received, e.g. fraud hotline, 
direct report, audit, analytics etc. 
16 
 Time that elapsed since first action/ transaction being committed until the white-
collar crime offence was discovered or an allegation received 
 Description of the type of offence 
 Description of specific white-collar crime-type category 
 Outcome of internal disciplinary hearing 
 Outcome of SAPS criminal matter, if finalised already 
 Monetary value of transgression upon finalisation of the investigation 
 
1.11 DATA COLLECTION 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010:105), the decisions on how and from where 
to collect the information, and the further interpretation once the data has been 
collected, have to be clarified and decided on before a researcher starts to write a 
research proposal. There are four (4) fundamental questions, as described by these 
authors, that have to be asked when deciding on the most appropriate data 
collection method(s). The four questions are as follows: 
 
 What data are needed?  
 Where are the data located? 
 How will the data be obtained?  
 How will the data be interpreted?  
 
Kumar (2011:35) elaborates that although, in broad terms, there are similarities 
between quantitative and qualitative research applicable to data collection, different 
approaches are required. In addition, Richie and Lewis (2003:109) specifically 
mention the absence of standard questions and interviews when following a 
qualitative research approach, but emphasise that there is still a crucial need for “in-
depth fieldwork,” which requires detailed planning. Richie and Lewis (2003:200) 
assert that less definite or clear-cut rules or procedures apply when making use of 
qualitative research. This leads to a number of different terms or approaches, which 
in turn largely depend on the main focus or aim of the analytical process. Most 
applicable to the qualitative approach of this research study is the term “content 
analysis,” as described by Richie and Lewis (2003:214). This term refers to when 
“both the content and the context of documents are analysed.” Additional themes 
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may be identified and the researcher then focuses on the frequency of these themes 
or specific occurrences. 
 
The researcher, in accordance with the terminology and elements defined by Richie 
and Lewis (2003:214) in respect of the topic of “content analysis,” selected a total 
of 326 staff investigative files that formed the basis for data collection and further 
analysis throughout this qualitative research study. The overall parent population 
pertained to internal staff investigative matters at the largest South African short-
term insurer. These were completed cases, either with criminal prosecution finalised 
or still in progress, and covering the period 2003 until 2016. In addition to the detail 
being available in the hard-copy files, the most crucial data fields relevant to this 
research were captured continuously in an electronic database. Readily available 
reports can be extracted, and regular back-ups of this database are standard 
procedure. The available reports were useful from a quality review perspective, as 
well as for the identification of potentially crucial missing information required for the 
profiling of staff as potential white-collar crime perpetrators working in the South 
African short-term insurance industry.  
1.11.1 Literature 
Kumar (2011:46) describes the literature review as one of the most “essential” steps 
in conducting research. This step initially consists of reviewing the available 
information, or alternatively its absence, and then conducting a high-level analysis 
and/or research of the relevant topic. Kumar elaborates on the potential future 
benefits of performing a literature review. Such benefits may include enabling the 
researcher to refer back to already available information, and to integrate his/her 
own findings and experience with the available literature from other authors or 
experts on the topic of interest. 
 
The researcher conducted extensive research and, found 27 randomly or partially 
matching research studies as well as journals and/or books in respect of the topic 
of this research. The random and partially matching details found, pertained only to 
specific parts of the topic of this research. No exact matching research could be 
traced in either a local or an international context as having been conducted to date. 
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The literature found included a significant number of books (printed and online), 
journals and White Papers, as well as other research studies having been published 
in respect of all the key search terms, as listed further on in this section, in both a 
South African and international context. Internet searches were conducted, using 
trusted library and research reference domains. Other sources used for information 
gathering included newspaper articles, industry publications, local and international 
fraud surveys, and intelligence sharing within the South African short-term 
insurance industry. Information obtained during commercial, industry-specific and 
professional conferences was considered during the literature review for this 
dissertation.  
 
Most of the available research and the relevant statistics for the short-term 
insurance industry are very specific with regard to all the types of insurance crimes, 
rather than the various types of white-collar crimes. This available information most 
often forms part of annual surveys conducted by a number of reputable external 
audit firms, governing bodies or industry forums. The researcher therefore 
continued to expand the detailed literature review to include all the keywords below: 
 
 Insurance fraud 
 Short-term insurance fraud 
 Profiling 
 Profile of a fraudster 
 White-collar crime  
 White-collar criminal 
 Pink-collar crime 
 Pink–collar criminal 
 Red-collar crime 
 Red-collar criminal 
 Fraud 
 Fraudster 
 Fraud triangle 
 Fraud risk 
 Fraud risk management 
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 Fraud red flags 
 Fraud prevention 
 Fraud deterrence 
 Proactive crime prevention 
 Corruption 
 Occupational crime 
 Opportunistic crime 
 Organised crime  
 Corporate crime 
 Corporate psychopath 
 
Based on the above-mentioned extended keyword search criteria, a significant 
further number of relevant literature sources such as books (printed and online), 
journals, White Papers, as well as published research from South African and 
international corporate sources were found. It was also found that there was less 
research on white-collar crime available in South Africa than internationally. 
 
Limited literature was found regarding the above-mentioned search criteria in 
relation to short-term insurance. Potential relevant reasons for the “lack of research 
on corporate crime” could be as stated by Geis and Meier (1977:304) and supported 
by Clinard and Yeager (1978:255-272), as follows: 
 
 The inexperience of social scientists in specialist fields such as law, finance and 
economics when studying corporate crime. 
 The limited experience of criminologists, with specific reference to corporate 
violations involving administrative and civil sanction. 
 Lack of general understanding when enforcement is carried out by state and 
federal (applicable to the USA) regulatory agencies, rather than the usual 
criminal justice agencies. 
 Limited funding being made available for such studies. 
 The nature of corporate crime is being made even more complex, due to the 
very complexity of corporations. 
 Data to be made available for research are very tightly controlled by the 
corporate boardroom. 
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 Specialist challenges and problems arise from analysis and research objectivity 
when a researcher focuses on corporate crimes. 
 
The researcher found the available research that has been conducted on “pink-
collar criminal profiling” interesting. When studying the literature, the researcher 
noted that the term “pink-collar” was originally used in 1978 (Kapp Howe, 1978:5) 
and at the time was used to describe and define all types of jobs that women would 
have typically performed. Over the years, the term was often found to be derogatory 
towards women, but then became popular once again when used in 1999, though 
this time around more specifically to describe the term pink-collar criminal 
(Gottschalk & Glasø, 2013:2).  
 
This term, as defined by these Norwegian researchers, refers to when women 
specifically commit white-collar crimes. Synonyms that are often used when 
referring to pink-collar criminals are “Gucci or Louis Vuitton” (Gottschalk & Glasø, 
2013:3) criminals.  
 
The researcher learned for the first time about the existence and prevalence of the 
term “red-collar criminal profiling” (Hansen, 2009:1). This term refers to white-collar 
criminals that have a tendency towards violence, e.g. the murder of business 
partners. Additional research on the topic of red-collar criminal profiling (Perri, 
2015:2) found that red-collar criminals are strongly emerging as a sub-group of the 
traditional white-collar criminal. The biggest current difference between these two 
groups is that in the case of a “red-collar criminal,” the dominant motive is to “prevent 
the detection and/or disclosure of their fraud [fraudulent] schemes through 
violence.” This research on red-collar criminals provides additional background, in 
particular to risk factors that could contribute to the prevalence of this emerging sub-
group. These risk factors include negative behavioural trends such as “narcissism 
and psychopathy.” 
 
On the topic of psychopathy, the researcher found it interesting that only a limited 
number of sources mention the various studies on “corporate psychopaths” (Babiak 
& Hare, 2006:8). After extensive research by Babiak and Hare (2006:10), they share 
their various findings on how the corporate world, specialising in “high risks and 
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high profits,” attracts psychopaths like a magnet. Babiak and Hare (2006:9-12) 
explain in detail how such individuals are initially employed as a “rising star” or a 
“corporate saviour,” but then, once inside a company, start to show their true colours 
and in the process, together with having no conscience, continue to leave a trail of 
destruction. This they do by abusing co-workers and manipulating management. 
The description used by these authors for psychopaths in the corporate world is 
“Snakes in Suits.” 
 
The researcher studied the ground-breaking research that defined the term “White-
collar criminal” (Sutherland, 1947:9) together with “The Fraud Triangle” theory 
(Sutherland & Cressey, 1978:5). Touch-points between the original work of 
Sutherland and his subsequent collaboration with Cressey some thirty years later 
were that an individual learns criminal behaviour, whether through “interaction with 
other people or intimate personal groups,” and that such behaviour is not “inherited.”  
 
According to available literature and still referring to the term “white-collar criminal” 
and the theory related to the “The Fraud Triangle,” the researcher found that even 
37 years later, these terms and theories were still deemed by Geis and Goff 
(1986:5) to be “pioneering” and relevant. Geis and Goff concluded that they were 
in agreement with Sutherland regarding white-collar crime being a “real crime.” This 
was due to criticism at the time that it is incorrect to define white-collar crime as 
such, since such incidents were largely dealt with in an administrative manner and 
not in courts that dealt with criminal transgressions such as murder. With regard to 
the earlier research by Sutherland (1947:9-45), the biggest single difference of 
opinion of these authors (Geis & Goff) was that they found that more emphasis had 
to be placed on the prevalence of individual white-collar criminals and not so much 
on the “violations of corporations” that formed the basis for most of Sutherland’s 
research. Geis and Meier (2013:5) continued to play a significant role in introducing 
these terms to the public and the professionals that investigate white-collar crime.  
 
Based on the above, the researcher does not agree with recent, renewed harsh 
criticism of the research and theories of Cressey (1973:30), Sutherland (1947:9), 
and subsequently Geis and Goff (1986:5). The researcher believes that none of the 
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current critics provides any real alternatives or new, ground-breaking research in 
respect of the investigation of white-collar crimes. 
 
Although extensive literature on profiling, or, what is alternatively referred to as 
“offender profiling” was studied, this research literature largely pertained to violent 
types of crimes and the profiling of murderers, serial killers and rapists. The 
researcher took note of suggestions, best practice, as well as criticism of profiling 
techniques, objectives, and uses mentioned in this regard, but it must be 
emphasised that only limited offender profiling literature was found that specifically 
referred to non-violent white-collar crime criminals, especially when staff 
(employees) commit this type of offence. Most of the profiling literature that focuses 
on the crime scene and analysis of such, unfortunately does not apply to the focus 
of this research, namely profiling of staff as potential white-collar crime perpetrators. 
1.11.2 Personal experience 
In addition to details of the above-mentioned literature topics listed, the researcher 
made use of personal experience gained in the short-term insurance industry. The 
researcher has been a team member of the in-house investigating unit at the current 
leading short-term insurer for the past thirteen years, and is currently responsible 
for the team conducting data-mining and providing analytics and intelligence 
assistance to the investigation team. The researcher previously worked as an 
internal auditor in a number of medium to large corporates in the South African 
financial services, retail and Fast-moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) industries. 
Besides a number of in-house completed training and leadership courses, the 
researcher has to date completed a National Diploma (ND) Internal Audit and a 
Bachelor Technology (BTech) Forensic Investigations, and is a qualified Certified 
Fraud Examiner (CFE). The researcher is currently enrolled at Unisa for the 
Master’s Degree in Forensic Investigation.  
1.12 DATA ANALYSIS 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010:142) are of the opinion that data analysis commences as 
soon as the researcher uses “categories to classify the data.” As the research 
progresses and more data is collected, there is often a constant “moving back and 
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forth between data collection and data analysis.” Creswell (2009:183) adds that data 
analysis is when the researcher makes sense “out of text and image data.” 
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010:153) mention and describe in detail the suggested steps 
in accordance with the “data analysis spiral” method of Creswell that includes the 
following four major steps, namely “organisation,” “perusal,” “classification” and 
“synthesis.” The researcher agrees with the suggested steps described above in 
order to take the data analysis from the initial process of starting with the “raw data” 
and eventually achieving the desired end-result of a “final report.” A description is 
given below of the processes and how the researcher incorporated the above-
mentioned suggested steps. 
1.12.1 Organisation  
The researcher carried out a data enquiry, using the database in which the majority 
of the fields in respect of internal staff investigative matters are captured. The data 
collected by means of this query then formed the base data. 
1.12.2 Perusal  
During this step, the researcher obtained initial high-level insight into available data, 
and general observations or trends that may already have emerged. In addition, 
further specific data fields were identified that had to be obtained from the physical 
investigation files.  
1.12.3 Classification  
During this step, the researcher proceeded with “grouping” the available data into 
specific or data-theme categories. Further meaningful observations and trends were 
considered during this phase, including trends that may have emerged following the 
previous “perusal” phase.  
1.12.4 Synthesis 
This is the step that requires the researcher to present the “hypothesis” or 
“propositions,” and includes the presentation of the “massaged” data in the form of 
graphs or “tables,” “diagrams” and “hierarchies.” As part of this step, the researcher 
24 
incorporated specific graphic displays with year-on-year comparisons of the period 
2003 to 2016.  
 
In addition to all the above, and more specifically in respect of the analysis of 
qualitative data, it is argued by Pope, Ziebland and Mays (2000:114) that, contrary 
to the general belief, when conducting qualitative research, a vast number of data 
will be produced. These authors elaborate more on “analytical processes” and 
“sampling strategies,” and they have applicable suggestions about the use of 
computer software programs that can be used for qualitative data analysis. Pope, 
Ziebland and Mays (2000:116) defined the so-called “Five stages of data analysis,” 
which include:  
 
 Familiarisation 
 Identifying a thematic framework 
 Indexing 
 Charting; and finally 
 Mapping and interpretation 
 
As part of this qualitative research, once all the relevant data had been collected in 
respect of the crucial fields as identified, the researcher commenced with further 
indexing and analysis. All the steps followed were documented. The results, once 
verified, and similar to the original internal “Profile of a Fraudster” exercise at the 
researcher’s employer, were communicated in a report, accompanied by relevant 
graphs, interpretations and notes. Relevant themes, if any, that may have emerged 
as part of the research and further analysis, were included, especially in the case 
of any new or emerging trends evident from the annual analyses during the period 
2003 to 2016.  
1.13 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE STUDY 
1.13.1 Methods to ensure validity 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010:97) describe validity as the overall “accuracy, 
meaningfulness and credibility” of the research proposal. In addition, these authors 
distinguished between internal and external validity. These two concepts are 
described as follows: 
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 Internal validity:  the degree to which the layout and information forming the basis 
of the research proposal ensure that the researcher will “draw accurate 
conclusions.” 
 External validity: the degree to which the results of the research can be applied 
to “situations beyond the study itself.” In addition, Kumar (2011:184) comments 
that one must distinguish between the significance and value of validity and 
reliability, depending on whether a quantitative or qualitative approach is applied 
to the research. Kumar elaborates that specifically in qualitative research, there 
are four suggested factors that ensure “trustworthiness.” The suggested factors 
to consider are: credibility; transferability; dependability; and conformability. 
 
The researcher applied a qualitative approach throughout the research. Creswell 
(2009:191) states that validity can be seen as a strength when a qualitative 
approach is applied, and he explains that it is based on ensuring that the outcome 
of the research is deemed “accurate from the standpoint of the researcher or 
readers.” Throughout this research, the researcher ensured as far as possible that 
the accuracy of the various available data as recorded and analysed, corresponded 
to the actual detail of the 326 investigative files pertaining to staff that had committed 
white-collar crime in the short-term insurance industry during the period 2003 to 
2016. The researcher ensured throughout this research that the findings and 
interpretation of the data analyses were tested with other senior management in the 
Group Business Integrity Unit at the leading short-term insurer in South Africa.  
1.13.2 Credibility 
Credibility can be defined as how believable or “true” the results of the research are 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985:285). These authors suggest a number of techniques that 
can be applied to ensure that the desired results are achieved. Creswell (2009:191) 
elaborates on these techniques and is of the opinion that in order to ensure accurate 
and credible findings, the steps listed in paragraphs 1.13.1.1 to 1.13.1.6 below are 
deemed to be of the outmost importance. This is a further detailed discussion of 
how the researcher incorporated these various techniques and steps: 
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1.13.2.1 Triangulate various data sources 
This refers to the scrutinising of results from all the various data sources in order to 
combine the results into a logical explanation of the respective applicable themes. 
The researcher studied the results following from the enquiry on the electronic 
database where the majority of details from the various investigative staff matters 
are captured and from which regular reporting and statistics are drawn. Certain 
specifically required data fields were identified as missing, and these were 
subsequently obtained from the actual physical investigative file or from the Human 
Resources (HR) department, where the standard employee files contain additional 
detail. The combined data set, including all the various updated information that was 
obtained, was maintained and entered onto an Excel-sheet in support of this 
research. 
1.13.2.2 Making use of member-checking 
Although this technique is, most often applied for verification of the preciseness of 
results of a participant (since no interviews or completion of questionnaires formed 
part of this research), it is suggested that dedicated topics or results from the various 
case analyses be reviewed for accuracy and that comments and suggestions in this 
regard are welcomed from outside “members.” From a member-checking 
perspective, the researcher made use of a dedicated data analyst who works with 
these investigative-type files and statistics on a regular basis, to ensure that from a 
perspective of logic there are no errors. In addition, another senior manager in the 
department, as well as the Head of the Business Integrity Unit, were often asked to 
be available in order to present and verify the results that were found during 
analyses of the available data. This approach also relates to the suggested 
technique further described below as “peer-debriefing.” 
1.13.2.3 Identifying potential researcher bias 
It is suggested that this technique be applied by means of “self-reflection by the 
researcher,” since Creswell (2009:192) is of the opinion that it is an indication of 
defined qualitative research when the researcher mentions how he/she interprets 
the various research findings influenced by the following factors: “culture, history, 
gender and socio economic origin.” The researcher took cognisance of this and at 
all times strove to be aware of the presence of research bias, but believes the 
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easiest way to counteract it is by regularly presenting and discussing the findings 
with other senior colleagues, including management outside the department, and 
with colleagues in the South African short-term insurance industry. 
1.13.2.4 Presenting negative or discrepant information 
A suggested advantage of applying this technique is that it ensures that research 
findings are potentially more “realistic and hence valid” (Creswell, 2009:192) when 
the researcher provides feedback on contradictory findings as regards what may be 
widespread viewpoints. As described above, and linked to the importance of 
spending “prolonged time in the field” mentioned below, the researcher is of the 
opinion that since one learns new things every day, experience certainly helped. 
The data analysis versus actual investigative detail may subsequently result in 
revealing trends of findings not previously noticed. Such detail has been noted 
throughout this research. One such revelation that followed from the analysis of the 
326 staff investigative files was that there were more female staff perpetrators than 
previously thought. Another significant finding was that the female staff perpetrators 
committed white-collar crime with a higher R-value than the male perpetrators. This 
contradicts the results reported in the various surveys to date, from the ACFE and 
the “Big 4” external audit firms. Where explanations for such new trends or findings 
were found, they have been incorporated, but further research may be needed 
before such findings can be fully explained.  
1.13.2.5 Importance of spending prolonged time in the field 
As more experience is gained while working in a specific industry or job (and the 
researcher provides feedback on this throughout the research) it may result in 
creating a more “real setting,” and potentially adding to the accuracy and validity of 
findings (Creswell, 2009:192).  
1.13.2.6 Incorporating peer debriefing 
This technique enhances the “accuracy” of the research findings and entails 
involving “a peer debriefer,” who performs the role of reviewing and challenging the 
approach and findings throughout the qualitative research.  
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The researcher has incorporated and applied the techniques described above 
during this research by means of constant feedback in respect of all relevant themes 
that may have emerged or been proven. Actual experience gained by the researcher 
during the past thirteen years in the investigation of white-collar crime in the South 
African short-term insurance industry has been incorporated throughout this 
research. Although no dedicated interviews have been conducted as part of this 
qualitative research, the accuracy of the research findings, themes and the various 
case analyses will be subject to constant review by co-workers who have completed 
Master’s or Doctoral degrees, or who are seasoned speakers at conferences and 
regarded as experts in the investigation of white-collar crimes in the South African 
short-term insurance industry. Five (5) so-called peer debriefers have been selected 
and approached by the researcher to solicit their future assistance in order to 
provide continuous critical feedback and to challenge the findings or themes 
throughout this qualitative research, which was done.  
1.13.3 Transferability 
Transferability is described by Lincoln and Guba (1985:288) as the ability to 
demonstrate that research findings can be applied in “other contexts.” Leedy and 
Ormrod (2010:97) give a very similar explanation, although they define it as 
“external validity,” but then continue to emphasise the extent to which the research 
results have to be applicable to “situations beyond the study itself.” Schurink, 
Fouché and De Vos (in De Vos et al., 2011:420) emphasise the further requirement 
that it is expected of the researcher to challenge the application of the research 
results from one exact situation to another. 
 
As part of this research, the researcher collected data from actual staff investigative 
files to white-collar crime committed in the South African short-term insurance 
industry. All 326 files contain detail related to staff who have committed white-collar 
crime transgressions in the South African short-term insurance industry in the 
period between 2003 and 2016. These closed files were perused, and observations 
or findings were analysed and interpreted as part of this research. In addition, 
details from the staff investigative files in the form of quarterly statistics are 
continuously communicated within the larger organisation of the employer of the 
researcher, and are then circulated in the wider short-term insurance industry via 
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the ICB. The outcome of each staff investigative matter results in a number of actual 
additional actions. Such actions can be influenced, depending on whether they 
originate from an internal (inside the specific short-term insurance company) or 
external (when further civil or criminal action is instituted) source: 
 
 Internal: Documented actions may be in the form of a disciplinary hearing, 
followed by relevant controls that have to be improved or rectified to prevent 
future similar investigations; or 
 External: The documented actions may include criminal or civil litigation against 
the guilty staff member who has committed a white-collar crime.  
 
The researcher is therefore of the opinion that in addition to the processes for data 
collection and data analysis that were followed and documented throughout this 
research, there are a number of independent platforms that could contribute to the 
corresponding verification and enhancement of the validity of this research. 
Regarding transferability, should the suggested processes for data collection and 
data analysis be followed and the required data fields be available for staff 
investigations, the researcher reasons that similar exercises can be successfully 
attempted for the potential profiling of white-collar crime perpetrators in the wider 
South African short-term insurance industry, and not only as it is currently, namely 
at the employer of the researcher.  
1.13.4 Methods to ensure reliability 
The reliability of a research proposal is described by Leedy and Ormrod (2010:29) 
as ensuring consistent similar results when using the same measuring instruments. 
Mouton and Marais (1996:79) have a similar view, but then elaborate on (4) four 
critical factors that may potentially impact on reliability when reporting on results 
obtained either through “observations,” or from the data collected throughout the 
research. The four (4) variables to consider in respect of reliability are as follows: 
 
 The researcher 
 The participants - whether groups or individuals 
 The measuring instruments being used 
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 The context and circumstances under which the research project is being 
performed 
 
The researcher can confirm that all literature sourced, as well as all other sources 
of information pertaining to this research topic have been acknowledged throughout 
and are included in the list of references at the end of this document. Since a 
qualitative approach forms the basis of this research and no interviews have been 
conducted, it is necessary to elaborate on the importance of dependability and 
conformability.  
1.13.5 Dependability 
According to Golafshani (in Lincoln & Guba, 1985:290), the terms “validity and 
reliability” are required for quality purposes when conducting quantitative research. 
When conducting qualitative research, the following terms are deemed more 
applicable, namely:  
 
 Conformability: also known as credibility or neutrality. 
 Dependability: often referred to as consistency.  
 
In addition, “applicability,” alternatively known as “transferability,” may apply, and it 
is explained that although “dependability” matches the concept of “reliability” in 
quantitative research closely (Lincoln & Guba, 1985:300), it must be emphasised 
that “both process and product of the research” must at all times be examined or 
audited, and that in terms of reliability in qualitative research, “trustworthiness is 
crucial.” 
 
As part of this research, actual, available staff matters that had been investigated 
during the period between 2003 and 2016 at the largest South African short-term 
insurer were analysed. These staff investigative matters totalled 326 files, 
specifically of white-collar crime in the South African short-term insurance industry, 
and subsequently formed the base set of data for this research. A standard format, 
defining sections and related documentation, was used to file staff investigative 
detail in the hard-copy files, and a similar logic was applied when the most crucial 
data fields were captured in the electronic database. A further continuous quality 
review process formed part of the investigative methodology at the employer of the 
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researcher. The latter is therefore of the opinion that “dependability,” also known as 
“consistency,” can be proven as part of this research study on the profiling of staff 
who commit white-collar crime in the South African short-term insurance industry.  
1.13.6 Conformability  
Kumar (2011:185) describes conformability as being possible only when 
researchers follow identical processes and the subsequent results are compared. 
In addition and specifically with reference to conformability Levy (2009:383) states 
that the results from qualitative research are often criticised by academics or the 
trustworthiness of such research is questioned. Levy (2009:383) is, however, of the 
opinion that trustworthiness from a qualitative research perspective can easily be 
addressed if the following concepts can all be “assessed.” The suggested concepts 
to take into account in order to ensure trustworthiness are as follows: credibility; 
dependability; and conformability. 
 
More specifically applicable to enhancing the trustworthiness of qualitative research 
are the suggestions from Levy (in Carson, Gilmore, Perry & Gronhaug, 2001:213) 
and these particular suggested considerations are the following: 
 
 The interpretation and examination of all appropriate literature in a careful 
manner. 
 Justification and reasons for the qualitative research methods being used. 
 Data analysis interpretation must provide for “full and descriptive evaluation and 
assessment.” 
 
Throughout this research, the researcher has documented all the steps applicable 
to the collection and subsequent analysis of the data obtained from the actual staff 
investigative matters. The crucial fields identified remained constant throughout this 
research. These fields were not a mere random selection, but are in line with a 
number of local and international surveys that were completed by renowned and 
trusted entities such as the following, dating back to 2007, when reporting on the 
so-called “Profile of a Fraudster.” 
 
 Klynfeld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KMPG) 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
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 Ernst & Young (EY) 
 Deloitte 
 Kroll Incorporated (KROLL) 
 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
 
This is not the first in-house attempt made at the employer of the researcher and 
leading short-term insurer (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015:22) to analyse these 
data fields by profiling internal white-collar crime perpetrators, namely staff, 
therefore findings from a previous, similar exercise were documented and are 
considered part of this research. The researcher is therefore of the opinion that 
requirements and guidelines for conformability have been met, since it will be 
possible for other researchers to follow similar steps, should they have similar data 
available from staff investigative matters. 
1.14 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Babbie (2007:62) stated that the most important principles to consider from an 
ethical review perspective when compiling a research proposal are the following: 
 
 Voluntary participation 
 No harm to the participants 
 Anonymity 
 Confidentiality 
 No deception 
 
Since a qualitative approach and content analysis have formed the basis of this 
research, it is explained by Orb, Eisenhauer and Wynanden (2000:93-94) that 
although ethical issues form part of any type of research, such principles are not 
very clear when conducting qualitative research. It is emphasised by Orb, 
Eisenhauer and Wynanden (2000:94) that even the research method and type of 
data collection decided on could create ethical issues. Similar to Babbie (2007:62), 
the authors Orb, Eisenhauer and Wynanden (2000:94) highlight the importance of 
“confidentiality” and “anonymity,” but elaborate that since qualitative research 
requires conformability, this means that all activities that formed part of the research 
have to be documented in order to create a future “audit trail for other researchers.” 
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Ethical codes and guidelines are mentioned but are believed by Babbie (2007:67), 
together with Orb, Eisenhauer and Wynanden (2000:93-94), to not have all the 
answers to ethical issues that may be encountered when conducting qualitative 
research. They suggest that in addition to strict adherence to ethical codes, it is 
most important that all ethical issues encountered when conducting qualitative 
research must be documented, since this will simplify future analysis, and 
subsequently assist or provide guidance for other researchers to not make similar 
mistakes.  
 
From a professional Code of Ethics perspective, the researcher subscribed to and 
was under obligation to comply with, the following: 
 
 Santam code of conduct 
 SAIA code of conduct 
 Being a CFE (certified fraud examiner), to the ACFE code of ethics 
 
In addition, the researcher adhered to Unisa’s Code of Ethics for Researchers, as 
described in the Policy on Research Ethics (University of South Africa, 2007:1-17). 
The latter has been incorporated in order to ensure “overall improvement of 
governance” at Unisa. This policy applies to everyone forming part of the extended 
Unisa community, which includes all relevant stakeholders, lecturers, alumni and 
also students. The code provides additional guidelines on all values and expected 
conduct in respect of the following: 
 
 Integrity 
 Accountability 
 Excellence 
 Academic freedom 
 Intellectual property 
 
On 31 January 2017, the researcher was granted approval by the Unisa Ethics 
Committee to proceed with this research. The approval letter is attached as 
Annexure B. The researcher at all times acknowledged all information and literature 
or data sources that were consulted in compiling this research. Throughout this 
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research, the researcher paid meticulous attention to all the steps and methods as 
suggested, specifically for collection and analysis of data, as described by Orb, 
Eisenhauer and Wynanden (2000:93), whether specifically pertaining to 
documentation or ethical issues encountered during this research. The researcher 
on 11 January 2018 submitted this research to Turnitin for the required originality 
comparison. The digital receipt as proof of this submission is attached as Annexure 
C. 
1.15 CHAPTER LAYOUT 
The two research questions indicated earlier are elaborated on in the following 
structured and logical way: 
 
Chapter 1: General orientation 
The focus of this chapter is on the overall, general structure and layout of this 
research proposal. This chapter includes coverage of the research problem, the aim 
and purpose of the research. In addition, dedicated focus is directed in particular at 
the various research objectives, the key concepts, as well as the defined research 
questions that formed the basis of this research. This chapter also includes 
discussions of the methods and techniques that were followed regarding research 
approach and design, population and sampling, as well as data collection 
processes, including the various requirements to ensure trustworthiness from both 
a validity and reliability perspective. Towards the final part of this chapter, dedicated 
consideration is given to ethical considerations when conducting research.  
 
Chapter 2: An analysis of what profiling entails 
The nature and objectives of a criminal investigation were discussed during the first 
part of this chapter. Thereafter, the characteristics of profiling, as well as specific 
white-collar crime identifiers were discussed. A brief synopsis of the fraud triangle 
and red flags applicable to white-collar crime behavioural analysis were the further 
focus of this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3: An assessment of the steps to profile white-collar crime 
perpetrators in the short-term insurance industry 
A discussion of the South African short-term insurance industry and the prevalence 
of white-collar crime formed part of the introduction to this chapter. A critical 
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assessment of the process of profiling and best practices followed. This chapter 
further focused on the suggested processes to adhere to when profiling staff who 
commit white-collar crime. 
 
Chapter 4: Findings, recommendations and conclusion 
The findings, recommendations and subsequent conclusion in reference to this 
research were covered in this chapter. 
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2. CHAPTER 2 
AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT PROFILING ENTAILS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Employee fraud has become a national epidemic. White-collar crime is 
estimated to cost the South African economy billions per annum and no 
industry or business sector can claim to be immune to it. It has, therefore, 
never been more important than now for companies to be vigilant in 
preventing fraud (Anton Meyer, Executive Head, SHA Specialist 
Underwriters, 2015:1). 
 
Year after year, the various local and international published fraud surveys by the 
“Big 4” audit firms, namely Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC, as well as similar survey 
results from the ACFE and Kroll Inc. report widely on the growing trend that has 
become known as the “insider threat.” This trend relates to the actual occurrence of 
misconduct by staff members. According to a Kroll Inc. survey report, the prevalence 
of the “insider threat” has increased proportionally over the years, i.e. from 55% in 
2010 to a staggering 81% in 2015 (Kroll Inc., 2015:9). Therefore, more than ever, 
the need for dedicated proactive white-collar crime-fighting initiatives instead of 
merely investigating misconduct is supported, and this includes transgressions in 
the white-collar crime category. The profiling of staff as white-collar crime 
perpetrators is one of many suggested proactive initiatives that companies could 
potentially implement, and the researcher will elaborate more on this topic 
throughout this research.  
 
In this chapter, the researcher attempted to answer the research question, i.e. “What 
does profiling entail?” as reflected in paragraph 1.6 of Chapter 1 of this research. 
Included in this exploration is the journey to gain a better understanding of profiling. 
A high-level discussion of historic milestones in the development of criminal profiling 
followed, and certain specific qualities that a successful criminal profiler need were 
explained. The categories to be considered when profiling white-collar crime 
perpetrators were discussed in more detail in this chapter. A brief synopsis of “The 
Fraud Triangle” followed.  
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A suggested practical application of this psychological process, through the 
interconnection to typical red flags that could be considered when conducting a 
white-collar crime behavioural analysis, was the focus of the last part of this chapter.  
 
The researcher is conscious of the fact that the vast majority of South African 
insurance-specific publications, investigative journalism and media coverage in all 
forms, i.e. print, television, internet and social media, most often focus on insurance 
white-collar crime incidents, with the insurer as the transgressor. Alternatively, there 
are reports on dishonest behaviour by policyholders or brokers, therefore the 
researcher chose to focus on staff as potential white-collar perpetrators. The 
systemic prevalence and impact of staff committing white-collar crime have to be 
better understood and reported on in more depth, instead of being mentioned in the 
occasional article when a staff member has been found guilty and sentenced, 
following the eventual completion of criminal prosecution. Once such example 
include a detailed article with input from a number of South African short-term 
insurers pertaining to the extent of insurance fraud, with coverage given to losses 
suffered largely through the practise of policy holders and touching on the category 
of “N/R’s” (no relationship) with examples based on the following scenario’s only – 
fraudulent claims, inflated claims or “claims padding” and syndicates exploring 
weaknesses in the systems of insurers, with no mentioning of staff as potential 
perpetrators (Justmoney, 2017:1).  
 
2.2 NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF INVESTIGATION  
According to Van der Walt, Cronjé and Smit (1985:24), a crime is defined as 
“conduct which common or statute law prohibits expressly or implied subjects to 
punishment remissible by the state alone and which the offender cannot avoid by 
his own act once he has been convicted.” These authors elaborate on the fact that 
criminal law and related investigations from a South African perspective are based 
on the “substantive law” and “law of evidence.” Substantive law refers mainly to 
“principles of law according to which criminal liability i.e. guilt or innocence is 
determined,” whereas the law of evidence part refers to “the related procedures 
used to decide criminal liability and theories of punishment.” 
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2.2.1 Meaning of criminal investigation 
Bennett and Hess (2007:29) explained a criminal investigation as “the process of 
discovering, collecting, preparing, identifying and presenting evidence to determine 
what happened and who is responsible.” These authors also elaborate on 
suggested steps and requirements, should a preliminary investigation be needed 
(Bennet & Hess, 2007:272), and advise that the criteria listed below could be used 
for measuring the success of an investigation. The criteria are defined as follows: 
 
 Following a logical sequence. 
 Ensuring that all physical evidence is obtained in a legally sound manner. 
 Ensuring that all witnesses are effectively interviewed. 
 Ensuring that all suspects are interrogated in an effective and legally sound 
manner. 
 All details of the investigation are recorded accurately, completely and reported 
on. 
 
Benson, Jones and Horne (in Zinn & Dintwe, 2015:18) instead describe a criminal 
investigation as: 
 
… a systematic, organised, thinking, reasoning examination and analysis 
process designed to search for the truth, during which an inquiry and 
thorough analysis is [are]conducted of all types of crimes or unlawful acts.  
2.2.2 Typical objectives of a criminal investigation 
In reference to the objectives of a criminal investigation, Becker and Dutelle 
(2013:18) agree with Bennett and Hess (2007:35) on the criteria stated below, and 
also address the belief that all crimes can and will be solved, or that even when the 
perpetrator is identified, it may still not ensure that the investigation is successful. 
Becker and Dutelle (2013:18), in agreement with Bennett and Hess (2007:35), 
define the objectives of a criminal investigation as the following: 
 
 Crime detection, including identifying the type of crime. 
 Suspects to be identified and located. 
 Evidence related to the investigation to be located, recorded and processed in a 
legally sound manner. 
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 Dedicated preparation prior to the trial and ensuring that complete and accurate, 
related documentation is included. 
 Obtain a conviction by testifying in a court of law and assist with the presentation 
of related evidence.  
 
The purpose of a typical criminal investigation is stated by Benson, Jones and Horne 
(in Zinn & Dintwe, 2015:18) as being to “legally gather information and evidence 
involving traditional methods guided by the Criminal Procedure Act,” with the aim 
to: 
 Reconstruct a crime scene 
 Identify the perpetrator 
 Discover, identify and collect objective and subjective information and evidence 
 Establish whether a crime has been committed 
 Determine what happened and who was responsible 
 Find a positive solution to the crime 
 Prepare a case for prosecution 
 Bring a case before a court of law 
 Ensure a successful prosecution 
 
Although the researcher finds the definition of a criminal investigation as stated by 
Benson, Jones and Horne (2015:19) more specific and applicable to white-collar 
crime types of investigations, including staff investigative matters in the South 
African short-term insurance industry, the requirement to “reconstruct a crime 
scene” very seldom, if ever, forms part of a typical white-collar crime staff 
investigative matter, since staff members these days make use of roaming desks or 
work remotely, and in the majority of instances use some form of technology to 
commit the related acts of misconduct. All these factors make the reconstruction of 
a crime scene quite impractical, if not impossible.  
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2.2.3 Defining forensic investigation versus forensic accounting 
investigation 
Golden, Skalak and Clayton (2006:111) are of the opinion that a forensic 
investigation follows when there is an increased cause for concern regarding 
1malpractice that may have occurred. Instead, a forensic accounting investigation 
mainly refers to the two classifications of financial fraud pertaining to “fraudulent 
accounting and reporting,” and the “missapropriation of assets” (Golden, Skalak & 
Clayton, 2006:110). It is, however, stressed that a forensic accounting investigation 
does not include providing “an opinion of financial statements as a whole,” but 
instead pertains to a forensic audit.  
 
The financial statements as part of a forensic accounting investigation will, however, 
be scrutinised in relation to specific transactions, individuals or sections of a 
business to assess whether there are any potential irregularities that may require 
further action. In contrast to the definition of Golden, Skalak and Clayton (2006:111), 
it is the opinion of Benson, Jones and Horne (2015:19-20) that a forensic 
investigation should rather be defined as: 
 
… an in-depth, meticulous investigation, searching for the truth through 
the use of specialised skills and expert knowledge, and the application of 
scientific investigation methods and techniques, in order to lawfully 
discover, collect, prepare, identify and present evidence which can be 
presented to a court of law, disciplinary council, instructing client or 
company.  
2.2.4 Typical objectives of a forensic investigation  
The aim of a forensic investigation, according to Golden, Skalak and Clayton 
(2006:111) should be the discovery of “evidence that maybe[may be] instructive as 
to the intent of those participating in the irregularity or the subsequent determination 
that no wrongdoing has occurred.” It is furthermore emphasised by Golden, Skalak 
and Clayton (2006:433-435) that the type of evidence that one must collect as part 
of a forensic investigation differs, depending on the nature and focus of the 
                                            
 
1 Improper, illegal or negligent professional behaviour 
41 
investigation, and the authors suggest that the following type of investigations will 
have the most significant influence on these two factors: 
 
 Vendor-related 
 Improper third-party-related activity 
 Employee investigations 
 Financial statement errors 
 Violations of specific legislation 
 
Additional guidance is provided on collecting and safeguarding of documents, 
ensuring a complete chain of evidence in support of the facts that have been 
obtained, as well as ensuring credibility and completeness of the working papers 
that formed part of the forensic investigation (Golden, Skalak & Clayton, 2006:435-
438). Differing from the definition of Golden, Skalak and Clayton (2006:111), 
Benson, Jones and Horne (in Zinn & Dintwe, 2015:18) assert that the main objective 
of a forensic investigation is to find a “positive solution to a crime or transgression” 
by means of the factors listed below: 
 
 Reconstruct a scene or incident. 
 Identify the perpetrator. 
 Discover, identify and collect objective and subjective information and evidence. 
 Establish whether a crime and/or irregular conduct has been committed and/or 
confirm an allegation. 
 Determine what happened and who is responsible. 
 Find a positive solution to the crime or incident. 
 Prepare a case for prosecution. 
 Bring a case before a court of law or presiding authority. 
 Ensure a successful prosecution. 
 Institute criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings. 
 Apply scientific knowlegde to a legal problem. 
 Methodically and systematically analyse evidence for the purpose of finding 
proof of and establishing financial transactions. 
 Identify motive and intent. 
 Examine and analyse documentation and financial records. 
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 Prepare evidence that will stand the scrutiny of the presiding authority. 
 Trace and recover stolen property or misappropriated assets. 
 
A further discussion focusing on the differences between a criminal and forensic 
investigation follows in paragraph 2.2.5.  
2.2.5 Differences between a criminal and forensic investigation 
In the definitions and explanations furnished by Bennett and Hess (2007:29), 
Golden, Skalak and Clayton (2006:111), as well as Benson, Jones and Horne (in 
Zinn & Dintwe, 2015:18), all these authors mention a detailed process that includes 
actions such as discovering, collecting, preserving and presenting evidence as a 
common theme. They further mention establishing how the crime was committed 
and who was responsible, in order to ensure that a valid case suitable for 
prosecution is presented, resulting in a successful outcome. The significant 
differences between a criminal investigation and a forensic investigation pertain to 
the following factors: 
 
 Establish and confirm the detail received as part of the allegation. 
 In addition or instead of a case being presented to a court of a law, it may be 
presented to other structures of presiding authority, and may include alternative 
actions such as disciplinary hearings, and administrative or civil procedures, 
instead of criminal prosecution only. 
 A different approach and methods of collecting evidence may be required for 
forensic investigative matters pertaining to legal scenarios or financial 
transactions and related records. 
 Ensure that appropriate action is taken to ensure the subsequent recovery of 
stolen property or misappropriated assets. 
 
Pertaining to the related definitions and explanations of what a criminal and forensic 
investigation entails, including the most significant differences, discussion of a 
potential investigative methodology is the focus of paragraph 2.2.6.  
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2.2.6 Suggested steps to include when conducting a forensic 
investigation, also known as investigative methodology 
Upon further analysis of the overall parent population and qualitative data, the 
researcher found that the largest short-term insurer in South Africa applied a high-
level investigative methodology that included these crucial six (6) steps: 
 
 Step 1: The allegation is received via any one of various reporting channels. 
 Step 2: A project or investigative matter is subsequently registered.  
 Step 3: A dedicated investigator is assigned to handle the forensic investigation. 
 Step 4: Depending on the outcome of the investigation and the evidence found, 
final feedback and recommendations are provided. 
 Step 5: Following the finalisation of the forensic investigation and based on the 
recommendations made, a disciplinary hearing will be scheduled if it is a staff 
matter. 
 Step 6: Based on the evidence and outcome of the forensic investigation and 
depending on the type of offence, additional civil and/or criminal prosecution 
could follow. 
 
The above-listed high-level steps forming the basis of a forensic investigative 
methodology are displayed in Figure 2.1 below: 
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Figure 2.1: Schematic explanation of the investigative methodology followed at the 
largest South African short-term insurer  
(Source: SANTAM Forensic Services, 2010:1) 
 
The researcher furthermore found that a typical South African short-term insurance 
investigation, emanating from the high-level process and the six (6) steps described 
above, most often includes the additional investigative actions detailed below, in 
order to adhere to the overall investigative methodology:  
 
 An allegation communicated to a number of reporting channels reaches the 
investigative unit, which could be in-house or outsourced at a South African 
short-term insurer. 
 The various types of reporting channels could be any of the following or even a 
combination – e.g. in person, by e-mail, telephone call, fax, or even a traditional 
letter in the mail, or via modern technology such as a Short Message Service 
(SMS), BlackBerry Message (BBM), or Whatsapp.  
 Due to the industry-wide collaboration in the short-term insurance industry, 
allegations could reach a short-term insurer via the ICB.  
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 The allegation might be recorded in some way or another, whether informally on 
a spreadsheet, but more often, similar to the process followed at the employer 
of the researcher, in an electronic database.  
 Capture of the information received in the allegation subsequently results in a 
consecutive case or project number being assigned. If the capture is submitted 
to an electronic database, a reference or case number is automatically 
generated, or could be assigned electronically.  
 Once the case or project number has been assigned to an individual, the 
assigned investigator conducts his or her investigation in relation to the detail 
and information as received.  
 The assigned investigator could be employed either in the forensic or 
investigative unit or department, or could be fulfilling a similar role as part of an 
outsourced investigative entity.  
 The investigative methodology applied may vary slightly among the various 
short-term insurers, but as a minimum they will agree to incorporate standard 
investigative techniques such as interviewing, evidence collection, background 
checks, document searches, financial analysis and, in recent years, the 
increased use of digital analysis. 
 Upon completion of the investigation and where an element of criminal conduct 
can be proved, a criminal case is registered at the appropriate SAPS branch. 
 Once the criminal case has been registered, the short-term insurance 
investigative matter, initially handled by the in-house investigator, assessor, or 
other dedicated outsourced investigator, is taken over by the SAPS investigating 
officer or other assigned resource(s).  
 Depending on the nature and amount (R-value) of the criminal investigative 
matter, the SAPS station could immediately assign the criminal case to a 
specialised branch, e.g. Commercial Crime, in order to ensure a faster and more 
focused investigation. 
 
The various individuals performing the role of investigator (short-term insurance 
industry or SAPS) and the prosecutor eventually meet in a court of law, where the 
prosecutor assists with preparing the case against the defendant. There may be 
pre- and/or follow-up meetings where the various parties meet.  
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Based on the above discoveries, following the analysis of the base data set of 326 
staff investigative matters covering the period 2003 to 2016, the researcher is of the 
opinion that should other South African short-term insurers contemplate profiling of 
staff as potential white-collar criminal perpetrators, the initial, most important 
considerations, would have to be: 
 
 Whether an investigative methodology is in place; 
 Assessing to what degree such methodology is being adhered to; or alternatively 
 Understanding the specific reasons for non-compliance with such a 
methodology, if it is indeed already in place.  
 
The absence of a dedicated investigative metholodogy being followed consistently 
in all staff investigative matters may subsequently result in the following 
shortcomings from the perspective of a potential white-collar crime profiling 
perpetrator:  
 
 Inconsistent data fields being available across the various investigative matters. 
 Year-on-year specific comparisons of the suggested categories may not be 
possible, due to the lack of consistent and complete data field information. 
 Specific new or emerging trends may not be noticable, due to missing 
comparative data fields in all the various suggested categories.  
 
Following from the detail provided as to what a criminal versus forensic investigation 
entails, and the suggested importance of implementing and ensuring adherence to 
an investigative methodology, a further discussion about criminal profiling follows in 
the next section.  
2.3 CRIMINAL PROFILING 
The exact origin of the concept of criminal profiling has to date not been established, 
but it is widely attributed to James Brussel, an American psychiatrist and 
criminologist. Brussel is believed to be the first individual to receive public 
acknowledgement in 1956, when he profiled the “Mad Bomber of New York” 
(Labuschagne, 2015:286). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was the first 
law enforcement agency to have dedicated employees operating in the capacity of 
performing criminal profiling and being employed in the so-called “Behavioral 
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Science Unit” (Labuschagne, 2015:286). Criminal profiling is also known as 
“offender profiling, criminal personality profiling, crime scene profiling, behavioural 
and psychological profiling,” while the individual responsible for collating the profile 
is known as the “profiler” (Labuschagne, 2015:283).  
2.3.1 Defining profiling 
Geberth (1996:6) described profiling as: 
 
… an educated attempt to provide investigative agencies with specific 
information as to the type of individual who could have committed a 
certain crime. It can be a valuable tool in identifying and pinpointing 
suspects, however it must be noted that the profile has its limitation. It 
should be utilized with sound investigative techniques.  
 
Labuschagne (2003:67) has a different opinion and instead explains profiling as 
“any activity specifically undertaken with the intent of assisting an investigator to 
determine the most likely type of individual to have committed a specific crime.” It is 
in addition stated by Labuschagne (2003:68-70) that profiling also entails forming a 
theory about the potential suspect, thereafter verbally and in writing communicating 
this theory to an investigator to ensure that the investigation concentrates on the 
suspect.  
2.3.2 Definition of criminal profiling 
The term “criminal profiling” is explained by Mokros and Alison (2000:25) as “the 
process of predicting the characteristics of an offender based on information 
available at the crime scene.” They also assert that “decisions about the likely socio-
demographic characteristics of that person are made on the basis of behaviour.” 
Turvey (2008:3), referring to a historic instance (refer to paragraph 2.3.3) 
emphasises that there is often an awkward connection or link between “criminal 
profiling, politics, religion and prejudice” that has to be taken into account at all 
times. Turvey (2008:4) also emphasises that “we cannot ignore this part of criminal 
profiling history. It must be studied. We must learn its lessons to better avoid 
becoming its victims.” 
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2.3.3 Evolvement of criminal profiling  
Turvey (2008:3) states that the first known, recorded use of criminal profiling dates 
back to the time of “the Roman Empire, Caligula.” An incident known as “blood libel,” 
dating back to the time of the Roman Empire, Caligula, is deemed the first recorded 
use of offender profiling (Turvey, 2008:3). The definition of “blood libel” is as follows: 
“being a false accusation or ritual killing made against one or more persons, typically 
of Jewish faith” (Turvey, 2008:3), and an example of how offender profiling can be 
biased towards certain religious groups, and an element to guard against when 
conducting profiling.  
 
Other scenarios beside religion may include prejudice towards a certain race, 
political belief or sexual orientation. In regards to profiling, Eaton and Korach 
(2015:2) explain that the FBI had formalised the use of the term “profiling” with the 
establishment of their “Behavioural Analysis Unit” in 1974, and ever since has gone 
to great lengths to formalise and incorporate procedural documents. It developed 
dedicated training guidelines in later years. Although most of the literature mentions 
the influence of and development by the FBI towards the science of “profiling,” the 
founding father of modern criminal profiling is Dr. Johann (Hans) Baptist Gustav 
Gross (Williams, 2015:10). As regards the objectives of profiling, Holmes and 
Holmes (1996:156) explain that there are three (3) main objectives, namely: 
 
 Social and psychological assessment of the offender. 
 A psychological evaluation of possessions found in the possession of suspected 
offenders. 
 Consultation with law enforcement officials on the best strategies that might be 
employed when interviewing suspects. 
 
Padgett (2015:67) concurs with Turvey (2008:13) that criminal profiling could also 
be referred to by using the following additional terms: 
 
 Behavioural profiling 
 Crime scene profiling 
 Criminal personality profiling 
 Offender profiling 
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 Psychological profiling 
 Criminal investigative analysis 
 Investigative psychology – a more recent term 
 
The researcher found that, for the purpose of this research, the definition of criminal 
profiling, including the alternative terms of behavioural profiling, crime scene 
profiling, criminal personality profiling, offender profiling, and psychological profiling, 
focused too much on violent crime instead of white-collar crime, with considerable 
emphasis on analysis of the crime scene. The alternative terms of criminal 
investigative analysis and investigative psychology were found to be more 
applicable to this research, and a further discussion of investigative psychology 
forms part of paragraph 2.3.4.  
2.3.4 High-level background of investigative psychology 
The term that became known as “investigative psychology” can be attributed to the 
research by Canter, dating back to 1984 (Turvey, 2008:34). Canter (2000:3) 
described investigative psychology as “to bring together the contributions that 
psychology can make to the investigation of all forms of criminal behaviour through 
the psychological and social scientific analysis of the actions of offenders as well as 
the investigative strategies and legal processes.” Based on the research regarding 
the principles of investigative psychology, two (2) software technology products 
have even been developed to date: 
 
 “Dragnet,” a “geographical offender profiling tool.” 
 A geographical decision-support system (informally referred to as the 
Huddersfield system) used by the London Metropolitan Police. The system 
contributes by “prioritizing likely perpetrators” that are already known because 
of their records, or are linked to previous investigations, as well as “linking a 
series of offences to a common offender.” 
 
Canter (2000:9) strongly advocates the general belief that by using “real-world data” 
in research, the results subsequently have real benefits, and in the process enable 
the researcher to develop a unique research style. This author (Canter, 2000:9) is 
of the opinion that research style can be described as each researcher having a 
“preferred style of doing research,” and when actual data, defined as “real-world 
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data” by Canter, are obtained from sources such as “police investigations and court 
cases or crime scenes it does not exist in a form amenable to the average 
researcher.” Challenges in this regard, described from a research perspective, can 
however, be counteracted by means of the application of the “Investigative 
Psychology meta-method” (Canter, 2000:10). The “three key stages” to be followed 
as part of this method to address the potential challenges if the research data are 
sourced from the sources defined by Canter (2000:10), are as follows: 
 
 Data-harvesting 
 Data-driven content analysis 
 Qualitative structured analysis 
 
As Canter (2000:3-10) continued to define his research, a fourth key stage was later 
developed, and became known as “Models of Human Action and Experience.” In 
addition to the above research, Canter (2009:251) subsequently collaborated with 
Youngs (2009:251), and together they developed a number of “narrative descriptive 
psychological frameworks,” known as the “four styles of offending” namely:  
 
 The Romantic Quest Narrative: This is when an offender views him-/herself as 
“powerful” and disregards the relative impact on “other individuals and their 
actions.” 
 The Tragedy Narrative: In this instance, the offender feels instead that his/her 
destiny is “pushed by the fates,” and this individual is not bothered by the 
potential impact on other individuals. 
 The Adventure Narrative: This offender pretends very much to be “professional” 
while enjoying the “power,” and regards other individuals as very much 
“irrelevant.” 
 The Irony Narrative: The offender views him-/herself as a “victim,” being more 
or less powerless, and may feel estranged from other individuals, while at the 
same time still regarding them as worthy of attention. 
 
Since profiling and criminal profiling have been defined, and a basic understanding 
of investigative psychology has been acquired, the focal point in the next discussion 
will be specifically on criminal profiling and the suggested offender characteristics 
that must be considered.  
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2.3.5 Criminal profiling and offender characteristics 
Mokros and Alison (2000:30) differ from Canter and Youngs (2009:251), and are of 
the opinion that, from a criminal profiling perspective, the focus has to be specifically 
on “socio-demographic” aspects only, instead of the various defined narratives. 
Mokros and Alison (2000:30), in their selected sample that refers to rape offenders 
from actual police files, categorise the various offenders as per the distinctive 
attributes listed below: 
 
 Age at the time of the offence 
 Ethnicity 
 Employment situation (i.e. whether employed or unemployed) 
 Labour type (i.e. whether skilled or unskilled) 
 Educational level 
 Qualifications 
 Whether the offender lives with someone or alone 
 Marital status 
 Imprisonment or detention prior to the index[indexed] rape offence 
 Criminal record 
 
Similar to Mokros and Alison (2000:30), but quite a number of years earlier, the 
authors Romney, Albrecht and Cherrington (1980:51-54), following a comparison 
and analysis of 49 white-collar criminals to prisoners, provide feedback in the form 
of specific categories. The categories and their influence on the decision of the 
offenders to eventually commit or re-commit their crimes, reflected in the research 
of Romney, Albrecht and Cherrington (1980:51-54), were as follows: 
 
 Length and severity of sentences 
 Marital status 
 Gender 
 Education 
 Substance abuse – including the presence or lack of this 
 Being religious or not 
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Although the researcher is very much interested in the research by Canter 
(2000:3-10) in respect of his theory about “Investigative Psychology” and on how to 
overcome potential challenges when working with “real-world data,” Canter’s 
suggested categories were subsequently found by the researcher to be less 
applicable. Following the analysis of the base set data of 326 investigative files 
covering the period 2003 to 2016, the eventual attributes as defined for specific 
categories were more aligned with the research applied by Mokros and Alison 
(2000:30), as well as with that of Romney, Albrecht and Cherrington (1980:51-54). 
The categories defined by the researcher as part of the detailed analysis of the base 
set data were as follows: 
 
 Age of the white-collar crime perpetrator at the time of the offence. 
 Gender. 
 Race (due to sensitivity and potential ethical concerns that may arise in this 
regard, the results of the analysis of this aspect were not reported on as part of 
the research). 
 Marital status at the time of the offence. 
 Highest qualification at the time of the offence. 
 Years of service at the short-term insurer at the time of the offence. 
 Job grade (level in the organisation) of the white-collar crime perpetrator at the 
time of the offence. 
 The average time it took for the misconduct to be discovered or allegations to be 
reported. 
 Method or relevant reporting channel through which the allegation was received. 
 Type of misconduct committed by the perpetrator. 
 The department or Business Unit (BU) that the perpetrator was employed in at 
the time. 
 Region (this indicator was used mainly to ensure that non-South African staff 
matters are excluded, due to the focus of this research). 
 Actual R-value of the misconduct at the time. 
 Suitable action taken against the perpetrator following the finalisation of the 
investigation (i.e. internally in the form of a disciplinary hearing, and externally 
by registering a criminal case or instituting civil action etc.). 
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The researcher will present an in-depth discussion in paragraphs 2.3.5.1 to 
2.3.5.1.16, pertaining to the results based on the incorporation of the suggested 
crucial categories and attributes. These results are in reference to an exercise on 
the profiling of known white-collar crime perpetrators that was carried out at the 
employer of the researcher. The results and findings could benefit the profiler when 
attempting to conduct profiling of potential internal white-collar crime perpetrators in 
the larger South African short-term insurance industry. 
2.3.5.1 Results regarding the categories and analysis of the base data set 
The most significant results found in each of the defined categories are presented 
below. These results followed from the initial capture of defined data obtained from 
the closed investigative internal staff matters at the largest South African short-term 
insurer, covering the period 2003 until 2016. The further analysis and subsequent 
interpretation of the related output are reported on in respect of age, gender, marital 
status, highest qualification, years of service, previous employer, type of 
misconduct, the monetary value, and outcome of the disciplinary hearing as well as 
the SAPS criminal matter. 
2.3.5.1.1 Age of the internal white-collar crime perpetrator 
An analysis of the base data set of 326 staff-related investigative files found the age 
of the internal white-collar crime perpetrator to be mostly in the age group of 30 to 
39 years. The overall age detail is displayed in graphic format in Figure 2.2 below. 
This outcome in respect of the typical age of the white-collar criminal at a South 
African short-term insurance corresponds to the survey results of especially the 
ACFE (2012) and PwC (2016). A detailed discussion of the “Profile of a Fraudster” 
survey results can be found in paragraph 3.6 of this research.  
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Figure 2.2: Staff investigative matters per age group 
(Source: Santam profile of a fraudster (2016) compiled by the researcher) 
2.3.5.1.2 Gender of the internal white-collar crime perpetrator 
With regards to the gender of the most likely, potential internal white-collar crime 
perpetrator in the South African short-term insurance industry, it was found that men 
are more likely to commit misconduct. According to the thirteen-year review period 
pertaining to the parent population, it was found that in 62,5% of the staff-related 
investigative matters, men where the white-collar crime perpetrators. This agrees 
with the survey results pertaining to a “Profile of a Fraudster,” as discussed in 
paragraph 3.6. Specifically referring to the gender profile of a typical white-collar 
crime perpetrator in the South African short-term insurance industry, the researcher 
would like to highlight the outcome of the R-value and case-by-case comparison, 
due to the spike in the number of female staff members committing misconduct 
between 2008 and 2013. Females commit white-collar crime that involves a higher 
single amount than their male counterparts. A further detailed year-on-year analysis 
covering the period 2003 until 2016 can be viewed in Figure 2.3 below.  
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Figure 2.3: Staff investigative matters per gender, year-on-year comparison 
(Source: Santam profile of a fraudster (2016) compiled by the researcher) 
 
2.3.5.1.3 Marital status of the internal white-collar crime perpetrator at the 
time of the offence 
From a marital status perspective, a further analysis of the parent population, 
consisting of closed staff-related investigative matters, covering the period 2003 
until 2016, revealed that married staff are most likely to commit misconduct, 
including white-collar crime offences. This outcome was in contrast to the general 
belief that single (or divorced/widowed) females were more likely to commit crime, 
as they are more prone to experiencing increased pressure related to the 
fundamentals of “The Fraud Triangle,” especially financial pressure, since they often 
have to provide for the children and the majority of the household expenses. Marital 
status is not a category typically included and reported on in the “Profile of a 
Fraudster” survey results, as will be noted in the discussion in paragraph 3.6. The 
researcher has always been interested in understanding whether the phenomenon 
of single or divorced/widowed females committing white-collar crime with the 
highest R-value on a case-by-case basis in comparison to their male counterparts 
is unique to the employer of the researcher or is in fact experienced by other 
insurers and financial institutions as well. The overall marital status analysis at the 
time of the offence is demonstrated in Figure 2.4 below.  
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Figure 2.4: Staff investigative matters and the marital status at the time of the offence 
(Source: Santam profile of a fraudster (2016) compiled by the researcher) 
 
2.3.5.1.4 Highest qualification of the internal white-collar crime perpetrator 
at the time of the offence 
The highest qualification of an internal white-collar criminal at the largest South 
African short-term insurer at the time of the perpetrator committing the misconduct, 
during the review period from 2003 until 2016, was found to be a Bachelor of 
Commerce (BCom) degree. The second-highest qualification of a perpetrator at the 
time of the misconduct being committed was an Master of Business Administration 
(MBA) degree. In 80,6% of the internal staff-related investigative matters pertaining 
to the base data set of 326 files, the white-collar criminal possessed a Matric 
(Std 10), these days referred to as a Grade 12 qualification. This outcome is in 
alignment with the education level survey results from the “Profile of a Fraudster” 
surveys of KPMG (2007), ACFE (2012) and PwC (2016).  
2.3.5.1.5 Years of service at the time of the offence 
The researcher established that at the time of committing the white-collar criminal 
offence (during the period 2006 to 2013), the internal white-collar criminal 
perpetrators at the largest South African short-term insurer had completed a service 
period of between one (1) to seven (7) years. The survey results from the “Profile of 
a Fraudster” (KPMG: 2007; ACFE: 2012 & PwC: 2016) covered in paragraph 3.6 in 
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this research reported similar results. This combined number of white-collar 
criminals with between one (1) to seven (7) years of service were responsible for 
57,9% of the misconduct committed during the thirteen-year review period.  
2.3.5.1.6 Initial R-value of the misconduct at the time that the allegation is 
received 
From the review and further analysis of the total number of 326 internal staff 
investigative matters that formed the base data set of this research, it was found that 
the initial estimated R-value, as reported and subsequently captured when the 
allegation was received, cannot be deemed an accurate reflection of the eventual 
R-value upon finalisation of the investigation. The researcher found that according 
to the base data set of this research, the average initial R-value when the allegation 
was received, was R36 782,29, while the average R-value upon finalisation was in 
fact R81 832,55. Since no comparative detail is available from the “Profile of a 
Fraudster” survey results (KPMG, 2007, ACFE, 2012 & PwC, 2016), the researcher 
could not establish whether this finding is correct or not. The researcher was, 
however, not very surprised by the average difference pertaining to the R-value upon 
receipt of the allegation until finalisation of the matter, since the reporter of the 
allegation merely relied on his/her assumption of what the impact of the misconduct 
was. Even when a matter is reported by a line manager or colleague within the 
business, they may at the time merely have a suspicion and not be certain of either 
how long the internal white-collar criminal has been committing misconduct, if indeed 
any, nor the actual extent of the crime. 
2.3.5.1.7 Monetary value upon finalisation of the internal staff investigative 
matter  
As discussed in paragraph 2.3.5.1.6 of this research, it was found that the average 
R-value of an internal staff investigative matter at the largest South African short-
term insurer is approximately 2,2% higher following the finalisation of the internal 
investigation. In only 4,29% of the internal staff investigative matters was the R-
value upon finalisation less than the estimated R-value when the allegation was 
received. In comparison, in all the available survey results, only the “Profile of a 
Fraudster” survey from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2012:6) 
consistently mentioned an average R-value per investigative matter. The ACFE, 
however, does not report on internal staff investigative matters, nor only on short-
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term insurance matters, and the average amount is indicated in dollar (U$) terms. In 
addition, their feedback included actual worldwide white-collar crime, while the focus 
of this research is South African short-term insurance, industry-specific only. The 
survey results from the “Big 4” external audit firms, except KPMG and PwC, only 
occasionally mention an average loss.  
2.3.5.1.8 Previous employer of the internal white-collar crime perpetrator  
Following the analysis of the overall parent population, consisting of 326 staff 
investigative matters at the largest South African short-term insurer, the researcher 
found that detail pertaining to the previous employer of the internal white-collar 
criminal was almost never recorded in the actual investigative files, and had to be 
obtained from the employee files available at the HR department. The exception 
found, although still not recorded as a specific field in the investigation file, was when 
the historic employment history was noted in a limited number of the investigative 
matters, either in the case notes, when a witness at the previous employer was 
interviewed, or in the detail obtained from the interview. In these internal staff 
investigative matters, the transgression committed was most often misconduct, for 
instance identity theft, lying about qualifications or previous work experience, or 
when during an investigation it is discovered that the individual may indeed have 
committed white-collar crime in some form at the previous employer, but no criminal 
charges had been laid and no other suitable action had been taken at the time. 
2.3.5.1.9 Manner in which the misconduct detail was received   
The researcher found that, based on the results obtained from the analysis of the 
base data set of this research, covering the period 2003 until 2016, the largest South 
African short-term insurer classified the various channels through which an 
allegation or so-called “tip-off” can be received as follows: branch request, own 
internal network, fraud line (internal), fraud line (ICB), e-mail, forensics e-mail 
address, proactive enquiry and SMS, with a total of 63,4% of the allegations or tip-
off detail received via the branch request channel, and another 23% received via the 
internal network channel. This result, as observed by the researcher, cannot be 
directly compared to the survey results in “Profile of a Fraudster” (KPMG, 2007, 
ACFE, 2012 & PwC, 2016), since the channels of these companies for receiving 
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white-collar crime-type, offence detail include all the following instead: “tip” or “tip-
off” as an overall category, and in addition: 
 Management review 
 Internal audit 
 External audit 
 Discovered by accident 
 Account reconciliation 
 Document examination 
 Monitoring 
 Law enforcement 
 IT controls 
 Confession 
 Other 
2.3.5.1.10 Time that elapsed since misconduct until time of allegation 
The review and subsequent analysis of the 326 internal staff investigative matters 
at the largest South African short-term insurer, covering the period 2003 until 2016 
revealed that in 42,6% of the finalised matters the misconduct committed was 
discovered following an allegation received within a mere twelve (12) months from 
the first transaction or action by the internal white-collar crime perpetrator. This 
result, in comparison to survey results (KPMG, 2007, ACFE, 2012 & PwC, 2016) of 
the “Profile of a Fraudster,” is quite positive, since as per the KPMG, ACFE and PwC 
detail, the time that had elapsed since the misconduct started until it was discovered 
was at all times between 18 and 24 months. The researcher, however, also 
established that in 14% of the internal staff investigative matters at the largest South 
African short-term insurer, the detail applicable to this category had not been 
captured. This pertained to older matters, dating back to 2003 until 2006.  
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The overall analysis of the time that had elapsed since the first transaction, offence, 
or misconduct being committed until the allegation was received, is demonstrated in  
Figure 2.5 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Time until misconduct of internal white-collar crime perpetrator was 
discovered 
(Source: Santam profile of a fraudster (2016) compiled by the researcher) 
 
2.3.5.1.11 Description of the type of misconduct/offence  
It was established by the researcher, following the detailed review and analysis of 
the base data set pertaining to closed internal staff-investigative matters, covering 
the period 2003 until 2016, that the majority of misconduct cases related to non-
compliance and/or transgressions regarding company policies and procedures, 
followed by unethical behaviour and non-compliance with HR policies, and with 
7,36% of the misconduct committed being related to receiving kick-backs or bribes. 
The researcher could not make direct comparisons of these results to the various 
“Profile of a Fraudster” survey results (KPMG, 2007, ACFE, 2012 & PwC, 2016), 
since their findings most often categorise either unethical-type detail or all the typical 
white-collar crime offence categories only. In addition, their survey results do not 
pertain to internal staff investigative matters only, and often also not only to South 
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Africa specifically, but instead covered either survey results pertaining to world-wide 
matters, Southern Africa or Africa as a whole. An analysis of the top ten (10) 
misconduct categories at the largest South African short-term insurer is presented 
in Figure 2.6 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Detail pertaining to the most significant type of misconduct committed by the 
internal white-collar crime perpetrator 
(Source: Santam profile of a fraudster (2016) compiled by the researcher) 
 
2.3.5.1.12 Outcome of the internal disciplinary hearing 
Following perusal of the base data set of this research, in regards to the 326 finalised 
internal staff investigative matters at the largest South-African short-term insurer, 
the researcher established that in 67,17% of these staff investigations a disciplinary 
hearing followed, with a subsequent guilty verdict in 31,9% of the matters. The major 
reasons for a disciplinary hearing not taking place were due to the staff member not 
arriving at the disciplinary hearing, termination of employment prior to disciplinary 
hearing, health reasons, or death while in service. The researcher could not find 
corresponding results from all the “Profile of a Fraudster” survey results (KPMG, 
2007, ACFE, 2012 & PwC, 2016), since none of these surveys to date has reported 
on detail specifically related to the scheduling and outcome of disciplinary hearings. 
These survey results will instead most often indicate an overall percentage of any 
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action that was taken or not taken against the white-collar crime perpetrator, while 
not focusing only on either short-term insurance nor South African investigative 
matters.  
2.3.5.1.13 Outcome of SAPS criminal cases finalised already 
Closely connected to the detail discussed in paragraph 2.3.5.1.12 of this research, 
pertaining to the outcome of scheduled disciplinary hearings and 326 finalized 
internal staff matters, the researcher established that in only 3,6% of the cases, civil 
litigation followed in addition to criminal prosecution, while cases were opened at a 
SAPS branch for criminal prosecution in a total number of 167 cases. In light of this 
result, it was not possible to do a comparative analysis of the “Profile of a Fraudster” 
results from (KPMG, 2007, ACFE, 2012 & PwC, 2016), since these surveys do not 
report on matters reported to law enforcement. In the free text fields, participants in 
the “Profile of a Fraudster” survey may share detail of further sanctions, including 
criminal, but such detail is not shared in the final survey result feedback. These 
survey results are also most often not South African, nor short-term insurance-
focused. The researcher established that for the period under review, namely 2003 
until 2016, only 17% of criminal matters were completely finalised. This result is 
described in Figure 2.7 below.  
 
 
Figure 2.7: SAPS criminal matters reported and finalised 
(Source: Santam profile of a fraudster (2016) compiled by the researcher) 
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2.3.5.1.14 Department or business unit in which the white-collar crime 
perpetrator was employed at the time 
Based on the review and detailed analysis of the internal staff investigative matters 
covering the period 2003 until 2016, the researcher established that at the largest 
South African short-term insurer, the internal white-collar crime perpetrator most 
often worked in the claims environment. This applied to 48% of the overall base 
data set. Significantly lower at 18% of the matters, the internal white-collar crime 
perpetrator worked in the Information Technology (IT) environment, followed by 
Underwriting, in either the personal or commercial part of the business. In only 4% 
of the concluded staff investigative matters, executive management was found to 
have been the internal white-collar criminal perpetrator. When comparing this result 
to the survey findings of the “Profile of a Fraudster” detail (KPMG, 2007, ACFE, 
2012 & PwC, 2016), the only correlation found was to a white-collar crime 
perpetrator who worked in the IT environment, and their other higher departmental 
or Business Unit (BU) detail involved an individual from either the finance 
department or procurement. None of the KPMG, ACFE or PwC surveys, however, 
mentioned of business related to the South African short-term insurance industry. 
The result is displayed in Figure 2.8 below.  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Detail of the area of business in which the internal white-collar crime 
perpetrator was employed  
(Source: Santam profile of a fraudster (2016) compiled by the researcher) 
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2.3.5.1.15 Region pertaining to the internal white-collar crime perpetrator 
Following the detailed review and analysis of the base data set of this research for 
the largest South African short-term insurer, the researcher established that the 
overall current regional indicators pertain to South Africa (SA), Namibia (Nam), Rest 
of Africa (SEM), and Other (SEM). In the South African regional indicator, further 
detail is classified in accordance with the nine (9) provinces, namely: Western Cape, 
Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Limpopo, North West, Free State, 
Mpumalanga and Kwazulu-Natal. With reference to the demarcation of this 
research, the researcher ensured that only finalised internal staff investigative 
matters indicated by the SA regional indicator were included.  
2.3.5.1.16 Job level of the internal white-collar crime perpetrator at the time 
of the offence 
Following the analysis of the overall base data set of closed staff investigative 
matters, covering the period 2003 until 2016, it was established that the job level of 
the most likely white-collar crime perpetrator at the largest South African short-term 
insurer was from middle to senior management level. This finding differs from the 
KPMG (2007) and ACFE (2012) results of their “Profile of a Fraudster” surveys, but 
does agree with the comparative findings from the PwC (2016) results. The 
researcher also established that although staff investigative matters regarding 
misconduct of executive-level employees pertained to 2,4% of the overall three 
hundred and twenty-six (326) matters, from an R-value and case-by-case 
comparison it was clear that these executive-level employees were responsible for 
49,2% of the overall losses over the thirteen-year review period.  
 
Based on the selected categories defined above and applied in the further analysis 
of the 326 files covering the period 2003 to 2016, the researcher would like to 
emphasise that other South African short-term insurers contemplating the use of 
profiling for internal white-collar crime perpetrators should rather steer clear of the 
use of racial classification as a potential category. Although race-specific category 
detail is widely available throughout companies these days, due to the various 
Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) and Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) legislative and reporting requirements, the sensitivity of such 
classification and the potential to offend from an ethical considerations perspective, 
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by far outweigh any potential arguments that may exist for the use of such specific 
profiling. In this regard, the researcher would like to refer back to the earlier 
reference to the often difficult relationship between “criminal profiling, politics, 
religion and prejudice” and the importance of considering and taking it into account 
at all times (Turvey, 2008:3), since profiling could contain elements of prejudice 
towards religious groups, certain race groups, political believes or sexual 
orientation. A further discussion will continue in paragraph 2.3.6 in respect of the 
consideration that must be given to the required qualities when recruiting an 
individual to perform the role of criminal profiler.  
2.3.6 Suggested qualities of a criminal profiler 
Turvey (2008:8) refers to the crucial qualities that are required for being a potential 
criminal profiler. These qualities, as listed below, were defined by Gross (1924:15-
25), and became known as the “Essential Qualities of a Criminal Profiler:” 
 
 A large amount [quantity] of consistent energy. 
 A high grade [degree] of self-denying power. 
 A good business head. 
 An agreeable manner. 
 A good education. 
 Accuracy and exactness in the search for facts (non-negotiable). 
 Clever reckoning skills versus fine speculating [speculative] skills. 
 The willingness to always carefully weigh the facts. 
 An honest character. 
 Preferably of modest character and by no means interested in public success. 
 A keen and sincere knowledge of man and human nature, including victims; 
witnesses, criminals and experts. 
 An encyclopaedic knowledge. 
 
During the past seven (7) decades (Williams, 2015:12), a number of leading 
investigative criminologists incorporated the research of Gross (1924:15-25), with 
some arguing that certain of the above-listed qualities were not a necessity in 
modern times. The researcher was, however, most astonished to find these 
suggested essential qualities defined by Gross (1924:15-25) to still be applicable 
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today. It is believed by Scriven and Paul (2004:1) that to succeed as a criminal 
profiler, an individual has to be a critical thinker. Scriven and Paul (2004:1) describe 
“critical thinking” as a skill set needed to “process and generate information and 
beliefs, with the habit, based on intellectual commitment, of using those skills to 
guide behaviour.” Scriven and Paul (2004:2) further explain that critical thinking 
differs, based on motive. If “grounded in selfish motives,” it can be used to 
“manipulate ideas and the outcome [will be] intellectually flawed,” but when based 
on “fair-mindedness and intellectual integrity,” most often it will be of a “higher 
intellectual order.” 
 
The researcher can confirm that the majority of qualities defined by Gross 
(1924:15-25) and authors Scriven and Paul (2004:1) are included when vacancies 
are advertised these days for available job opportunities in the intelligence fraternity 
in the corporate world, including in the South African short-term insurance industry. 
Regarding the suggested qualities needed to perform the task of a criminal profiler, 
white-collar crime identifiers to be considered, together with coverage of the 
Typology of White Collar Crime, will form the basis of paragraph 2.4 and the related 
sub-paragraphs.  
2.4 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME IDENTIFIERS TO CONSIDER 
The theory related to white-collar crime is attributed to Professor Edward Sutherland 
and his research that eventually led the way to his presidential address, as 29th 
President of the American Sociological Society, in 1939 on the topic “The White 
Collar Criminal,” to the American Sociological Association (Baker, 2004:1). A 
derivative term and often used as an alternative to “white-collar crime,” is “organized 
crime.” A further discussion will follow from paragraph 2.4.1 onwards, covering the 
definition of white-collar crime, thereafter an explanation of the typology of white-
collar crime, and lastly an explanation of the emergence of the term known as 
“misconduct.”  
2.4.1 Definition of white-collar crime  
White-collar crime, according to Clinard (1952:227), refers to “violations of law 
committed primarily by groups such as businessmen, professional men, and 
politicians in connection with their occupations.” Besides this to-the-point definition, 
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Clinard continues to refer to the research of Sutherland and his definition of white-
collar crime, which instead described white-collar crime as a crime “committed by a 
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” 
(Sutherland, 1947:9). The Ethics Institute (TEI) (2008:1), an independent South 
African public institute, is of the view that a more detailed and lengthy definition to 
define white-collar crime is needed and not mere high-level categories. White-collar 
crime is described by TEI as: 
 
… the unlawful, intentional committing [commissioning] of deceit, 
concealment, manipulation, breach of trust, subterfuge, or any other 
similar trickery by an individual, syndicate or organisation, normally after 
meticulous planning and usually without the use of physical violence, that 
causes actual economic prejudice or potential economic prejudice to 
another.  
 
As for female offenders, TEI (2008:3) referred to the term “pink-collar crime,” and 
elaborated that due to equal employment opportunities for women these days the 
prevalence of females committing white-collar crime offences would increase in 
future. 
2.4.2 Typology of White-collar crime 
Occupational fraud and the listed, related categorisation are defined by the ACFE 
(ACFE, 2012:6) as “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through 
the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources 
or assets.” The list of related categorisation included in the definition of occupation 
fraud includes the following: 
 
 Corruption 
 Asset misappropriation 
 Financial statement fraud 
 Theft of cash 
 Fraudulent disbursements of inventory and other assets 
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When focusing on occupational white-collar crime, research overlaps between 
where the crime was committed, versus in what specific capacity the employee 
committed the white-collar crime. As a possible suggestion to ensure a clearer 
differentiation, the so-called “Typology of White Collar Crime” was developed by 
Edelhertz (1970:73). This theory divides white-collar crime details of various 
offences into two (2) main groups, namely: 
 
 Group A: Classified as white-collar criminals who commit “crimes in the course 
of their occupations [by those operating] inside business, government, or other 
establishments in violation of their duty of loyalty and fidelity to employer or 
client;” and  
 Group B: Defined as white-collar criminals who commit “crimes incidental to, and 
in furtherance of business operations, but not the central purpose of the 
business.” 
 
Edelhertz (1970:75) elaborated that typical white-collar crimes by Group A offenders 
who commit crimes as part of the normal execution of their daily jobs were most 
often related to: 
 
 Commercial bribery and kickbacks 
 Bank violations 
 Embezzlement or self-dealing 
 Securities fraud 
 Employee petty larceny 
 Fraud by computer 
 Sweetheart contracts 
 Fraud against the government 
 
For the second group, the white-collar crimes being committed were rather specific 
offences such as: 
 
 Tax violations. 
 Anti-trust violations. 
 Commercial bribery of another’s employee. 
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 Officer or fiduciary, including union officers, who may commit white-collar 
crime or play a role in offences such as insider trading, abusing their position 
of trust, and commit securities fraud or embezzlement of union funds. 
 
Although in agreement with Edelhertz, (1970:75) about the fact that white-collar 
crime can be found in “many forms,” Gottschalk (2010:17) in more recent years 
argued that the various types of white-collar crimes should rather be split into four 
(4) main categories and not only the limited, overarching two (2) of Group A and 
Group B offenders. The categories as defined by Gottschalk (2010:17-22) are as 
follows: 
 
 Corruption 
 Fraud 
 Theft 
 Manipulation 
 
There is a relationship between the Typology of White Collar Crime (Edelhertz, 
970:73) and the various types of white-collar crimes that staff commit against their 
employer, according to Padgett (2015:15), namely:  
 
 Abuse of power 
 Embezzlement 
 Misuse of business time 
 Computer fraud 
 Computer sabotage 
 Stock or equipment pilferage 
 Expense abuse 
 Theft 
 Procurement fraud 
 Bribery 
 Corruption 
 Counterfeiting 
 Forgery 
 Credit card fraud 
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 Extortion 
 Financial statement fraud 
 Insider trading 
 Intellectual property theft 
 Kickbacks 
 Bank fraud  
 Money laundering 
 
Expanding on the Typology of White Collar Crime and the arguments of Gottschalk 
(2010:17-22) and Padgett (2015:15) regarding the overall categorisation of white-
collar crime types and the manner in which offenders commit the related 
irregularities, the researcher in paragraph 2.4.2 suggests an additional over-arching 
model to consider when grouping different types of white-collar crimes specifically 
with regard to the South African short-term insurance industry.  
2.4.3 Emergence of the term “misconduct” 
Due to the difference of opinion among the various researchers regarding the 
classification and definition of white-collar crime, the researcher, while reviewing the 
326 staff investigative files that formed the base data set for this research, learned 
that the largest South African short-term insurer (Moneyweb, 2015:1) instead makes 
use of one overall, defined term, namely “misconduct,” and then divides it into sub-
categories. The sub-categories that are included in the term “misconduct” are the 
following: 
 
 Unethical behaviour: This includes offences pertaining to transgression of the 
Code of Ethics, Disciplinary Code or Grievance Procedures, Values of the 
Company and/or the Guidelines of Good Business Practices. 
 Insurance crimes: Incorporates offences such as “fraud, theft, money 
laundering, corruption and cyber-crime.” 
 
The single defined term of “misconduct” and the various sub-categories used by the 
largest South African short-term insurer are displayed in Figure 2.9 below: 
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Figure 2.9: Schematic display of the high-level misconduct viewpoint incorporated by the 
largest South African short-term insurer  
(Source: SANTAM, Group Forensic Services Unit, 2015:1)  
 
This overall single, defined term of “misconduct” was adopted following a 2015 
(Santam, 2015:1) review of the investigative framework and methodology at the 
largest South African short-term insurer. A decision was subsequently taken by the 
management team of the Forensic Department, that due to a number of legislative 
and industry regulatory changes, and the nature of actual investigations, the term 
“misconduct” is a more comprehensive and inclusive term instead of the individual 
criminal transgressions defined previously. TEI (2008:2-4) often mentions the over-
arching term of “misconduct,” although it does not define it as clearly, and rather 
elaborates on the typical white-collar crime identifiers and/or circumstances that 
have to be present in order for misconduct to occur. These suggested white-collar 
crime identifiers and the correlation to misconduct will be discussed in more detail 
in paragraph 2.5. 
 
The use of the overall term of “misconduct” and the sub-categories as defined and 
in use at the largest South African short-term insurer since 2015, correspond to the 
research of Gottschalk (2010:17-22) that additional high-level categories are 
required to define white-collar crime. The researcher deemed the four (4) categories 
as suggested by Gottschalk (2010:1-22) as too few, since they do not cover 
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unethical types of behaviour and related transgressions or irregularities. Although 
the two-category classification of Edelhertz (1970:73) may seem quite limited, the 
specific differentiation, as stated in the “Typology of White-Collar Crime,” is 
supported by the researcher, who asserts that a definite separation is required in 
order to avoid the general overlap between where the crime was committed versus 
in what specific capacity the employee committed the white-collar crime. Suggested 
white-collar crime identifiers related to misconduct will be the focus of the discussion 
in paragraph 2.4.2.1.  
2.4.3.1 White-collar crime identifiers related to misconduct 
TEI (2008:4) argues that the following white-collar crime identifiers or related 
circumstances have to be present in order for misconduct to be committed by a 
perpetrator: 
 
 Financial pressure or low self-esteem due to social pressure. 
 Opportunities that exist in the normal execution of an individual’s daily work may 
tempt them to become dishonest. 
 An individual may become aggrieved or dissatisfied due to being overlooked for 
a promotion, or being treated unfairly from a remuneration perspective, or could 
merely be bored, and this might tempt him/her to become dishonest. 
 A belief (whether accurate or not) that “legislation is insufficient” or that 
enforcement from a regulatory or justice perspective is lacking, may result in a 
“lack of fear.” 
 Starting to pay bribes or accepting bribes may follow, due to pressure linked to 
“unfair competition in the market and with the hope to gain market share in 
return.” 
 When management behaves in an unethical manner and are, seen doing it, 
general employees may soon display the same behaviour. 
 The “disintegration of values in social structures” have in turn resulted in a 
decline and sometimes even failure of principles and values of conduct. 
 “Power” and “greed” are believed to often play a more significant role in the 
individual becoming dishonest in comparison to perhaps being “needy.”  
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Considering the use of the emerging term of “misconduct,” as well as the white-
collar crime identifiers that have to be present for related transgressions to occur, 
the researcher, based on experience, proposes an integrated framework to combat 
misconduct, as discussed in paragraph 2.4.2.2.  
2.4.3.2 Suggested integrated framework to combat misconduct 
The researcher, following the further analysis of the base data set 326 staff 
investigative matters, covering the period 2003 to 2016, found that the largest South 
African short-term insurer had incorporated the majority of the suggested proactive 
measures as advised by the leading external audit firms, and had defined this as a 
“Business Integrity framework” (BIF). This Business Integrity Framework consists of 
elements ensuring coverage of the following: 
 
 Deterring unethical behaviour. 
 Preventing misconduct by means of a strong governance structure, dedicated 
awareness and training, a robust fraud-risk management process, and focusing 
on process improvement from an enhanced control perspective. 
 Detecting and responding to opportunistic and organised white-collar crime after 
various allegations had been received, or where such allegations were 
supported by intelligence-driven actions. 
 At all times ensuring that sanctions are enforced (i.e. disciplinary hearings, or 
civil and criminal prosecution, as applicable), continuous focus on recovering 
losses suffered through misconduct, and reporting on savings where incidents 
of misconduct had been prevented or minimised.  
 
Figure 2.10 below depicts a schematic display of the Business Integrity Framework, 
which incorporates high-level focus of all components required to address the 
prevalence of white-collar crime. 
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Figure 2.10: Schematic display of Business Integrity Framework at the largest South 
African short-term insurer 
(Source: SANTAM, Group Business Integrity Unit, 2015:3)  
 
The BIF in use at the leading South African short-term insurer, with regard to 
proactive actions to detect misconduct, makes use of intelligence-driven initiatives 
that incorporate the use of red flags. Closely connected to the use of red flags, which 
is discussed in paragraph 2.6.3 of this research, is the requirement for a thorough 
understanding of “The Fraud Triangle,” presented in paragraph 2.5.  
2.5 THE FRAUD TRIANGLE 
“The Fraud Triangle” principles developed during 1953 by Dr Donald R. Cressey, a 
well-known criminologist at the time (May, 2015:56-57), led to a subsequent formal 
definition by the ACFE. Cressey (1953:1) was of the opinion that the so-called 
“Fraud Triangle” had to contain three (3) specific fundamental elements in order for 
a fraudulent act to be committed. These fundamentals were defined as follows:  
 
 Pressure 
 Opportunity 
 Rationalisation 
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A number of adaptations are used today throughout the forensic investigative world, 
but “The Fraud Triangle” is still explained and based on the three (3) original 
fundamental elements defined by Cressey (1953:1). Figure 2.11 below represents 
a schematic summary of “The Fraud Triangle.” 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Schematic adaptation of the Fraud Triangle 
(Source: Adapted from The Fraud Triangle Cressey, 1953:1) 
 
It is widely believed that the only one (1) of the three (3) elements that could be 
controlled to a certain extent is “opportunity.” The researcher is in agreement with 
this view, but from a “transactional analysis” perspective only. A “Transactional 
analysis” application and applicable examples may include daily tasks being 
performed by a staff member or exercising his/her access rights to a system. The 
researcher can in this regard provide the following example from a “behavioural 
analysis” perspective: - a staff member with known financial pressure can, with the 
help of line management, the Human Resources (HR) and initiatives such as 
employee assistance programmes, through which emotional support and guidance 
in respect of managing personal finances are provided, turn their situation around, 
resulting in the related “pressure” being lowered and preventing them from being 
tempted by available “opportunity” in a system. 
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Regarding the element of “pressure,” consideration must be given to the possibility 
that although it is often caused by the staff member him-/herself, the employer may 
indirectly add or create the “pressure.” If the pressure originated from a staff 
member’s own perspective, it could relate to realities such as when he/she has 
excessive debt, an addiction of any kind, or a family member experiencing such 
challenges, or gambling, living above his/her means, exorbitant spending on cars, 
holidays and clothes to impress neighbours or family members, especially in 
challenging economic circumstances. On the other hand, pressure could originate 
from the employer, without the latter necessarily intending it to have consequences 
that could result in misconduct. Pressure from an employer could occur when the 
company decides to no longer pay bonuses, or to lower annual increases, and staff 
members who may have bargained on this in order to cover increased living 
expenses, all of a sudden find themselves with a financial shortfall and subsequently 
start “rationalizing” about the company not looking after them anymore. Should an 
“opportunity” of any kind present itself, the staff member may succumb to the 
temptation and commit misconduct (FANews, 2009:1). Since the release of “The 
Fraud Triangle” (Cressey, 1953:1), a number of theories emerged over the past six 
(6) decades, challenging the validity and practicality in modern times of considering 
only the three (3) fundamental elements of “pressure, opportunity and 
rationalisation.” One of the most prominent of these theories is the so-called “Fraud 
Diamond” that will be discussed in more detail in paragraph 2.5.1. 
2.5.1 The extended fraud triangle  
During 2004 an updated and more comprehensive interpretation of “The Fraud 
Triangle” was suggested by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:6), and became known 
as the “Fraud Diamond.” Wolfe and Hermanson as part of their interpretation added 
the fourth dimension, namely “capability” to the previously defined three (3) 
elements of “pressure, opportunity and rationalization.” The fourth dimension, 
“capability,” is explained by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:6-10) as pertaining to the 
following: 
 
 Position or function 
 The human brain 
 Confidence and/or ego 
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 Cultural issues 
 Coercion skills 
 Effective lying 
 Immunity to stress 
 
Although the researcher takes note of this suggested, expanded theory and the so-
called “fraud diamond,” the related application and interpretation of the original “The 
Fraud Triangle” were applied for the purpose of this research. In addition to the three 
fundamental elements of “The Fraud Triangle,” namely “pressure, opportunity and 
rationalisation,” there is the consideration that should be given to characteristics that 
pertain to psychology and sociology. More detailed coverage of this consideration, 
together with a discussion on the “Sykes and Matza Neutralization Theory,” can be 
found from paragraph 2.5.2 onwards in this research.  
2.5.2 Psychological and sociological profiling elements to consider 
Eaton and Korach (2015:134-137) refer to the three elements that formed part of 
“The Fraud Triangle,” and they assert that the following psychological and 
sociological profile elements could be assigned to each of the fundamental 
elements instead:  
 
 When focusing on the element of “opportunity,” factors that could have an 
influence, include “industry culture,” “corporate culture” and “individual trust.” 
 The element of “motivation” can be influenced by their so-called defined “general 
deterrence theory,” “rational choice theory,” and “general strain theory.” 
 As for the element of “rationalization,” and although Eaton and Korach prefer to 
rather use the term “neutralization,” it is believed that the following defined 
theory, namely the ‘Sykes and Matza Neutralization Theory’, may have an 
impact. 
 
The Sykes and Matza Neutralization Theory (1957:664-670) refers to the research 
by Gresham Sykes and David Matza (1957:664-670) on young adults, and the 
authors' subsequent conclusion that behaviour or conduct that “violate[s] norms or 
go[goes] against believes[beliefs]” when associated with “guilt and shame,” resulted 
in persuading the young adults to in fact not commit criminal acts, including acts of 
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petty crime. Sykes and Matza (1957:667), as part of their theory, defined these five 
(5) neutralization techniques: 
 
 Denial of responsibility 
 Denial of injury 
 Denial of victims 
 Appeal to higher loyalties 
 Condemnation 
 
A more detailed discussion of the psychological and sociological profile elements 
(Eaton & Korach, 2015:134-137) that can be assigned to the three (3) fundamental 
elements of the “The Fraud Triangle” will follow in paragraph 3.3 of this research. 
However, a further discussion of red flags applicable to the fraud risk-management 
process will follow.  
2.6 RED FLAGS APPLICABLE TO THE FRAUD RISK-MANAGEMENT 
PROCESS  
Annual survey results published by governing bodies such as the ACFE and 
reputable external audit firms often include specific findings that relate to certain 
behavioural trends that were displayed by perpetrators and of which actual case 
studies have been included. Such trends are referred to as “red flags.” 
2.6.1 Definition of a red flag 
According to Padgett (2015:71), red flags, also known as “fraud warning signs,” can 
be described as “an event or set of circumstances, most often unusual in nature and 
that should alert an organization to the presence of risk.” It is explained by Romney, 
Albrecht and Cherrington (1980:51-54) that the use of red flags “warns of a fraud-
conducive environment in a company.” These authors list specific red flags to 
consider from a “personal versus situational” perspective, and thereafter elaborate 
on “opportunistic” red flags only.  
2.6.2 Definition of fraud risk management 
Fraud risk management can be described as “activities aimed at identifying and 
developing actions for the organization to reduce risks arising from the actual or 
potential cases of fraud” (KPMG, 2010:2). Cotton, Johnigan and Givarz (2017:47) 
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are of the further opinion that fraud risk management is a “systematic process that 
has benefits beyond protecting assets and reputations.” 
2.6.2.1 Fraud risk management suggested guideline to consider 
During the last quarter of 2016, the ACFE and the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) combined efforts and 
published the COSO/ACFE Fraud Risk Management Guide (Cotton, Johnigan & 
Givarz, 2017:48). These new guidelines are still very much based on the original 
1992 COSO framework, and the five (5) crucial elements of the fraud risk-
management guide can be summarised as below, according to Cotton, Johnigan 
and Givarz (2017:49-54): 
 
 Establish a fraud risk governance policy. 
 Assess fraud risk. 
 Design and implement fraud control activities. 
 Establish reporting and investigation processes. 
 Monitor the entire fraud risk-management process. 
 
From practical experience, and following the update of the Business Integrity Risk 
(former Fraud Risk) methodology, as well as using the COSO/ACFE guidelines 
where required, the researcher can explain the above-mentioned five (5) crucial 
elements as follows:  
 
 Establish a fraud risk governance policy: At the largest South African short-term 
insurer, a fraud risk governance policy was implemented ensuring that roles and 
responsibilities were assigned and understood throughout the company. 
Drafting, rollout and continuous awareness sessions in respect of policies and 
procedures related to fraud risk management followed, and most importantly, 
ensured that a sound “Tone at the Top” (TTT) was established, and that the 
management would set the example with regard to not condoning any form of 
misconduct, which includes any unethical behaviour. The policies to consider 
from a fraud risk governance perspective are: declaring any potential conflict of 
interest, whistle-blower protection, response plan when misconduct is 
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discovered, where to report, and the investigative methodology that has to be 
adhered to. 
 Assess fraud risk: Fraud risk assessment is the process pertaining to 
understanding the nature of the fraud risk within a specific industry and the 
company itself, and should consider the size of the company, the operational 
model, and the complexity of the business environment. The researcher found 
that a fraud risk assessment process has to focus on identifying the inherent 
risks in a process, take into account the controls or absence of controls to 
address the identified risks, assess the likelihood that the identified risk might 
materialise, and lastly determine the subsequent impact, should the risk indeed 
materialise. The respective companies will not have the same risk appetite, 
known as “risk tolerances,” and this view of tolerance adopted at a company and 
most often influenced by the TTT will subsequently impact on the pressures and 
opportunity to commit misconduct. 
 Design and implement fraud-control activities: The researcher established that 
fraud-control activities have a bearing on all the policies and processes, 
awareness, and continuous training to prevent misconduct from happening, or 
methods to at least ensure early detection. 
 Establish reporting and investigation processes: Ensuring that well-established 
reporting mechanisms have been implemented, and widely communicated to 
staff and business partners in general, will guarantee that when any misconduct 
is observed, everyone in the company or conducting business with the company 
will know where, how and to whom to report their suspicions. The researcher 
found that when a company such as the largest South African short-term insurer 
is transparent about the investigative methodology that is followed, it provides 
clarity on whom feedback will be given to, and reassures whistle-blowers 
regarding victimisation of any kind. Their identities are protected and they may 
remain anonymous, should they wish to. These factors all contribute to 
enhancing the probability that incidents of misconduct will be reported.  
 Monitoring the fraud risk-management process: Monitoring of the fraud risk-
management process is an on-going process that could be outsourced, but most 
often resides within a company in the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
division or department. At the largest South African short-term insurer and 
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employer of the researcher, the process applicable to the continuous monitoring 
of the fraud risk-management process is guided by an overall plan that is linked 
to annual planning of the ERM team, or ensures that the whole company is 
covered over a three-year period. The following factors may impact on the 
planning, since any of these may require the company to update the fraud risk 
profile of a specific section of the company sooner rather than later: (i) Significant 
misconduct, whether from an impact or pure rand-value (R) perspective, or (ii) 
other major changes, such as new technology being implemented, (iii) mergers, 
(iv) Joint Ventures (JV), or (v) the acquisition and conclusion or sign-on of a new 
business partner. 
 
The COSO/ACFE Fraud Risk Management guide advises that once the fraud risk-
management policy has been fully implemented, additional consideration can be 
given to add-ons such as action regarding the deterrence of fraud and the use of 
resources, for example interactive scorecards, creating anti-fraud data analytic 
tests, risk assessment follow-up action templates, or points of focus documentation 
templates. Earlier tools published by the ACFE could subsequently be incorporated 
into the COSO/ACFE Fraud Risk Management Guide. One such tool includes the 
Fraud Prevention Checklist, which is described in more detail in paragraph 2.6.2.2.  
2.6.2.2 The fraud prevention checklist  
The ACFE (2012:70) issued an initial framework that became known as the “Fraud 
Prevention Checklist,” which has since been widely incorporated by a number of the 
South African short-term insurers, including at the researcher’s employer. The 
“Fraud Prevention Checklist” (2012:70-74) is a condensed, potentially proactive 
fraud-prevention tool that can easily be incorporated into a standard fraud risk 
methodology process. It consists of short, but detailed questions, with tick-boxes 
next to each question, covering the following aspects: 
 
 Is on-going fraud training provided to all employees of the organisation? 
 Is an effective fraud-reporting mechanism in place? 
 To increase employees’ perception of detection, have the relevant proactive 
measures been taken and publicised [communicated] to employees?  
 Is the management climate / “tone at the top” one of honesty and integrity? 
82 
 Are fraud risk assessments performed to proactively identify and mitigate the 
companies’ vulnerabilities to internal and external fraud? 
 Are strong anti-fraud controls in place and operating effectively? 
 Does the internal audit department, if one [does] exist; have adequate resources 
and authority to operate effectively and without undue influence from senior 
management? 
 Does the hiring policy, as permitted by law, including [include] the typical 
suggested checks? 
 Are employee assistance programmes in place to assist employees struggling 
with addiction, mental/emotional health, family or financial problems? 
 Is an open-door policy in place that allows employees to speak freely about 
pressure, providing management the opportunity to alleviate such pressures 
before they become acute? 
 Are anonymous surveys conducted to assess employee morale? 
 
The researcher found the “Fraud Prevention Checklist” (ACFE, 2012:70-74) to be a 
most valuable component when conducting fraud risk-assessment workshops. A 
further benefit in the experience of the researcher is that the succinct layout of the 
“Fraud Prevention Checklist” (ACFE, 2012:70-74) makes it easy for management 
to use as a self-assessment evaluation to determine whether improvements are 
required from a governance or ethical climate point of view within their area of 
responsibility. A further discussion on how to potentially consolidate the three (3) 
elements of “The Fraud triangle” as part of a fraud risk-management process and 
the red flags, is covered in paragraph 2.6.3. 
2.6.3 Suggested red flags to consider from an occupational fraud and 
fraud risk-management perspective 
It has to be emphasised that red flags are merely potential indicators that there 
might be something to investigate more closely. The presence of red flags by no 
means constitutes definite evidence of misconduct per se, therefore it is advisable 
that one should be careful in how one reacts to the presence of a red flag (Golden, 
Skalak & Clayton, 2006:127-128).  
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From actual experience, the researcher, advises that although the presence of red 
flags often serves as a reason for further enquiries, it must by no means simply be 
assumed that an individual has definitely committed a form of misconduct. 
 
The ACFE in its annual global survey, “Report to the Nations” (2014:22), with 
specific reference to occupational fraudsters, lists potential red flags very similar to 
those provided by Deloitte (2012:11-20), and states that in: 
 
 92% of cases analysed as part of that year’s survey, “the fraudster displayed at 
least one of these behavioural red flags 
 64% of the cases analysed, a combination of behavioural red flags was 
displayed 
 
From information contained in Deloitte (2012:11-20) as well as from lessons learnt 
in respect of fraud risk-management methodology that is followed by the leading 
South African short-term insurer, it is suggested that the following red-flag scenarios 
should be considered, namely: 
 
 Unexplained variance between known sources of income and an employee’s 
lifestyle. 
 Continuous, different explanations being provided as reasons for apparent 
sudden change in lifestyle, e.g. always winning prizes, or always being the lucky 
recipient of an inheritance reward. 
 Persistent allegations or rumours about an employee’s lifestyle/management 
style, preferential treatment of specific suppliers or vendors, creditors or debt 
collectors showing up at the workplace, a criminal record, poor credit rating. 
 Conflicting relationships or interests in external business not declared. 
 Excessive gambling habits. 
 Substance abuse problems. 
 Rapid staff turnover, whether due to termination, resignations and/or low staff 
morale. 
 Unrealistic productivity or profit targets, which may subsequently result in 
“pressure” as being one of the elements in Cressey’s “The Fraud Triangle.” 
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 Emotional trauma in home or work life. 
 Stealing of any kind, e.g. cash, petty cash, supplies, equipment, tools, data, 
records. 
 Always re-writing or re-doing records or entries under the guise of neatness or 
being a perfectionist. 
 Lack of original documentation or supporting evidence for transactions, most 
often only photocopied documents. 
 Complex transactions, processes or business deals that only this one or a limited 
number of employees understand or can deal with. 
 Failure to take leave, without good reasons. 
 Refusal of promotions; this is more often an indication of the fear of being 
detected. 
 Familiarity with operations; this includes years of service, being in a position of 
trust and of being able to “cover up” acts of misconduct. 
 “Too good to be true” observation: Always first to arrive at work, always last to 
leave, or working excessive overtime. 
 Insufficient segregation of duties or placing too much trust in one key employee. 
 Always providing some kind of excuse as to why he/she has to work alone on 
an assigned task(s). 
 Always the first to discover apparent vulnerabilities in processes or systems, this 
may often be an attempt to keep the focus away from what the individual him-
/herself may in fact be busy with. 
 Easily annoyed by reasonable questioning; cannot relax, is defensive and 
argumentative. 
 Borrowing money from colleagues, versus the opposite of lending or advancing 
cash or loans to colleagues. 
 Continuous problems, disputes or fines from regulatory bodies. 
 
The above-listed red flags and related importance are emphasised by not only the 
external audit firms, but also TEI as well as the ACFE. In Figure 2.12 below, the 
researcher provides a schematic illustration of how to combine typical red flags, 
behavioural analysis and the three (3) fundamental elements, as defined by “The 
Fraud Triangle” (1953:1).  
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Figure 2.12: Schematic display of the consolidation of red flags, behavioural analysis and 
the fundamental elements of The Fraud Triangle 
(Source: SANTAM, Group Intelligence Unit, 2014:2) 
 
The largest South African short-term insurer and employer of the researcher 
incorporated red-flag identification indicators into its fraud risk-management 
methodology. A number of other South African short-term insurers follow a similar 
approach. The researcher is of the opinion that “The Fraud Triangle” continues to 
serve as the renowned foundation for conducting behavioural analysis when 
profiling potential white-collar criminal perpetrators, including staff in the South 
African short-term insurance industry. In addition, the researcher is in agreement 
with the suggestion by Eaton and Korach (2015:134-137) that further psychological 
and sociological profile elements must be added to each of the three (3) 
fundamentals of “The Fraud Triangle.” Lastly, it must be emphasized that red-flag 
indicators indeed correspond to the additional psychological and sociological 
elements as required, and that an integrated approach is necessary in order to 
conduct successful profiling of white-collar crime perpetrators. Taking into account 
that the ACFE, according to best estimates and their annual worldwide survey 
based on actual fraud investigative matters, found that companies on average lose 
5% of “annual revenues” to fraud, (ACFE, 2012:1) the researcher wants to highlight 
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the necessity for an integrated approach to combat misconduct, and that focusing 
on individual aspects only, e.g. just a transactional analysis or red flags in isolation, 
or not analysing or learning from historic investigative matters, might not be enough 
in the complex business world of today and in view of the growing phenomenon of 
white-collar crime.  
2.6.4 Suggested proactive white-collar crime measures to consider 
The recommended proactive measures by the various external audit firms are 
reiterated by the South African TEI, which suggests the following additional “crime-
prevention measures:” 
 
 Communicate the effects of crime 
 Create awareness by training all personnel 
 Enforce a Code of Ethics 
 Management, including the executives, to set an example 
 Follow the principles of good corporate governance 
 
The so-called “Big-4” audit firms, namely Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC, in 
accordance with their various annual South African and international fraud surveys, 
recommend that companies incorporate the following proactive measures in order 
to protect themselves against white-collar crime and the associated impact, namely: 
 
 Having a fraud response plan. 
 Benchmark fraud risk and review controls. 
 Continuous fraud-awareness training. 
 Implementing training and ensuring that staff have a detailed understanding of 
the company’s code of ethics and gift policy. 
 Having a fraud/ethics hotline where staff can report their suspicions without fear 
of intimidation or victimisation, and may exercise their right to remain 
anonymous. 
 Expert forensic support. 
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Regarding the suggested proactive measures to prevent misconduct within the 
South African short-term insurance industry, significant focus is placed on 
transactional analysis actions, such as predictive modelling, link analysis, and 
various data analysis techniques, e.g. “Computer-aided Audit Tools” (CAATS) in 
order to identify and investigate misconduct committed by the five (5) known 
perpetrator groups, namely: 
 
 Policyholders (clients) 
 Suppliers 
 Intermediaries (brokers) 
 No Relationship (N/R’s) 
 Staff (employees) 
 
Based on experience gained in the South African short-term insurance industry over 
the past 13 years, the researcher is of the opinion that in respect of staff as potential 
white-collar crime perpetrators, an added component called “behavioural analysis” 
is required. This type of analysis and the guidelines to consider are covered in detail 
on a continuous basis by the ACFE, as well as TEI (2008:4) in their lists of white-
collar crime identifiers or related circumstances that have to be present in order for 
misconduct to be committed. 
2.7 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the researcher endeavours to bring about an increased awareness, 
but also a better understanding of the research question “What does profiling 
entail?” In order to accomplish this, an initial introduction was necessary for 
understanding a criminal investigation, the typical objectives of a criminal 
investigation, as well as the nature of a forensic investigation, and the most 
significant differences between a criminal versus a forensic investigation. The 
importance of an investigative methodology and the consequences, should such a 
methodology not be in place or not be adhered to, was explored.  
 
Thereafter, there was an introduction to the definition of criminal profiling and the 
phenomenon of investigative psychology, with dedicated focus on certain offender 
characteristics that must be considered when profiling potential white-collar criminal 
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offenders throughout the South African short-term insurance industry. The 
researcher endeavoured to explain what is meant by the term “white-collar crime,” 
and highlighted certain white-collar crime identifiers that pertain to misconduct. “The 
Fraud Triangle,” together with relevant psychological and sociological profiling 
elements to consider, were elaborated on.  
 
The latter part of this chapter included extensive coverage of the use and 
interpretation of red flags, as well as the suggested application of the Fraud 
Prevention Checklist as part of any effective fraud risk-management strategy. In this 
chapter, the researcher also elaborated on the findings obtained from the analysis 
of the base data set, based on the overall parent population of 326 internal staff 
investigative matters at the largest South African short-term insurer, the employer 
of the researcher. Where possible, graphs and diagrams were incorporated in order 
to explain these results and the related interpretation of the findings when compiling 
the “Profile of a Fraudster,” based on the data applicable to the period 2003 until 
2016. 
 
The phenomenon of the “insider threat,” which refers to misconduct by employees 
within a company, continued to increase annually, according to surveys released. 
With reference to research detail published by Kroll Inc., the actual percentage of 
employees committing misconduct increased proportionally from 55% (Kroll 
Incorporated, 2010:6) to a staggering 81% (Kroll Incorporated, 2015:9) over a mere 
five-year period. The ACFE estimates that companies in general are set to lose “5% 
of revenues due to fraud” (ACFE: 2012:5) annually and in the case of South African 
short-term insurance companies, this estimated 5% must be calculated as 5% of 
their annual Gross Written Premium (GWP) in order to obtain a potential estimate 
of what their loss due to misconduct is. As economic conditions in South Africa 
continue to become more challenging, and this fact may have a negative impact on 
the GWP of short-term insurers due to policyholders who can no longer afford short-
term insurance and continue to cancel their policies, it must be remembered that 
staff members also continue to experience financial pressure. Should South African 
short-term insurers not be vigilant and the opportunity exists, it may just create the 
perfect conditions for the next act of misconduct to be committed. 
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In order for South African short-term insurers to protect themselves against the 
phenomenon of “insider threat,” perhaps it is not a case of more regulation being 
required, but rather a detailed understanding of how to effectively and in a practical 
manner apply fraud risk management. Furthermore, an integrated approach is 
required that not only focuses on the investigation of white-collar crime, but in 
addition ensures that dedicated resources are applied to the prevention, deterrence 
and early detection of misconduct, and that includes enhanced focus on staff as 
potential perpetrators of white-collar crime. 
 
“What can we do? For the last 20 years I have been talking prevention. Maybe it does not 
sound as exciting as tracking down the bad guy, but it pays much better rewards” (Wells, 
2012: 3). 
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3. CHAPTER 3 
STEPS TO PROFILE WHITE-COLLAR CRIME PERPETRATORS IN THE 
SHORT-TERM INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate scandals of recent years have clearly shown that the plethora 
of laws of the past century have not eliminated the less savoury side of 
human behaviour. Rules cannot substitute for character (Alan 
Greenspan, US Federal Reserve Chairman, 2004:1). 
 
The South African short-term insurance industry is an extremely regulated industry. 
While on the one hand, it is governed from a legislative perspective by the “Short-
term Insurance Act of 1998,” from a regulatory perspective it has to adhere to the 
stipulations of the Financial Services Board (FSB) as well as the Office of Short-
term Insurance Ombudsman. The latter, generally known as the “OSTI,” looks after 
the rights of policyholders and has the authority to overrule decisions on claims 
settlements made by a short-term insurer. Non-adherence to either or both the 
legislative and regulatory specifications may subsequently result in fines issued 
against such an insurer.  
 
Failure to pay these fines, or not implementing the specified recommendations or 
remedial actions as suggested could lead to more severe punishment, the worst 
being the insurer having its operating license withdrawn. If the insurer is listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), it has to comply with various financial 
reporting regulatory criteria, as specified in the Companies Act, 2008. The South 
African short-term insurance industry will most likely experience a further increase 
in the complexity of governance and compliance, due to a number of pending 
regulatory frameworks, together with legislative changes. The latter are expected to 
be promulgated towards the middle of 2019. These regulatory and legislative 
changes, when implemented locally often follow similar reforms implemented, most 
often in the European or United Kingdom insurance-related industries (FANews, 
2009:2). 
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Although these legislative and regulatory requirements contribute to ensuring 
potential strong governance frameworks throughout the South African short-term 
insurance industry, they are more often focused towards ensuring that: 
 
 Insurers have sufficient capital reserves to fund insurance claim payments. 
 Intermediaries (brokers) treat policyholders fairly at all times, from both 
underwriting and claims settlement perspectives. 
 
All the legislative and regulatory requirements, however, do not necessarily help 
South African short-term insurers with counteracting the phenomenon of the “insider 
threat” and the prevalence of white-collar crime at a short-term insurer. This, 
therefore, remains the responsibility of the South African short-term insurance 
industry, i.e. to ensure that they remain vigilant and continue to explore all available 
solutions from both a transactional and behavioural analysis point of view.  
 
In this chapter, the researcher aspired to answer the second research question, 
namely “Which steps should be taken to profile employees committing white-collar 
crime in the short-term insurance industry?” by initially providing high-level 
background detail on the South African short-term insurance industry, and secondly 
focusing on the prevalence of white-collar crime within this industry. Following from 
there, this chapter includes a critical assessment of the suggested best practice and 
processes for profiling. In conclusion, there are suggestions to consider, as well as 
possible pitfalls to avoid when profiling staff that may be potential white-collar crime 
perpetrators in the South African short-term insurance industry. 
3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SHORT-TERM 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
In a South African context, an insurance contract can be defined, according to Nagel 
(2000:196), as: 
 
… a reciprocal contract between insurer and an insured in terms of which 
the insurer undertakes to pay the insured an amount of money or its 
equivalent, in exchange for payment of a monetary premium, should the 
risk, borne by the insurer on behalf of the insured, materialise by the 
happening of an event in which the insured has an interest. 
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The origin of the concept of short-term insurance according to historic estimates 
dates back to the concept of transferring risk during the second and third millennia 
BC. From there, the concept of insurance gradually evolved through the centuries 
and during the fourteenth century, insurance contracts as Single Case Agreements 
(SCAs) started to emerge. During 1666, the following major milestone occurred, 
being the “Great fire of London,” during which 13 000 houses were damaged. This 
subsequently gave rise to the concept of the insurance business that was developed 
in 1680 by Edward Lloyd, still known today and still in business as “Lloyds of 
London” (Beattie, 2011:3). In South Africa, the concept of short-term insurance was 
introduced when Mutual and Federal Insurance, these days known as Old Mutual 
Insure, was founded in 1831. 
 
PwC (2016:19) reported in their annual survey, focusing on an analysis of the South 
African insurance industry, that from a short-term insurance industry perspective, 
the following short-term insurers are the current major role-players, based on (a) 
GWP, (b) underwriting margin, (c) overall market share, (d) claims ratio as the 
contribution from their various local subsidiaries, and (d) internationally-based 
business interests: 
 
 Santam 
 Old Mutual Insure (former Mutual and Federal Insurance) 
 Outsurance 
 Hollard 
 Telesure 
 Discovery Insure 
 ABSA Insurance 
 King Price 
 
It is reported that although the South African short-term insurance market used to 
be largely intermediary-driven, the entry of a number of direct insurance role-players 
in the last ten (10) to fifteen (15) years, on the one hand has created more 
competitive market conditions, but on the other hand the industry now offers a much 
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wider selection for potential policy holders to choose from PwC (2016:25). The 
emergence of the direct short-term insurance market resulted in a number of the 
older and more traditional South African short-term insurers establishing a separate, 
direct insurance business. In reference to the recently changing landscape, from a 
direct insurance perspective, the most prominent is Santam, with MiWay as its direct 
business partner, and Old Mutual Insure, with iWyze as its direct insurance business 
venture partner. Since the beginning of 2017, and blamed on increasingly 
challenging economic circumstances, a number of mergers and acquisitions took 
place in the South African short-term insurance industry, subsequently resulting in 
Hollard moving to the second spot, following approval by the Competition 
Commission of their buy-out of Regent Insurance (Business Live, 2017:1). At the 
same time, Santam expanded its market share by obtaining a majority interest in 
ABSA Insurance Brokers, buying out the former Rand Merchant Bank (RMB) 
Structured Insurance, and announcing a joint venture with The Professional 
Provident Society (PPS), (Business Live, 2017:2). 
3.2.1 Prevalence of white-collar crime in the South African short-term 
insurance industry 
Beattie (2011:1) states that according to the history of short-term insurance fraud, 
the first recorded incident dates back to 300 BC, and was committed by a Greek 
merchant, namely Hegestratos. The transgression at the time was defined as 
“bottomry.” The researcher could not find evidence of a specific, first short-term 
insurance fraud incident in a South African context, but did learn from available 
records that the first known incident reported at the second-oldest and current 
largest short-term insurer dates back to 1953, and was related to a crop insurance 
fraud incident (Santampos, 1993:17).  
 
Moving forward to 2017 - quite different from the occasional recording of incidents 
related to short-term insurance fraud, all types of white-collar crimes, including 
fraud, have become part of conducting business for all insurers. Estimated figures 
released by the ICB (2015:1) projected the loss due to short-term insurance fraud 
at approximately R4 billion annually, and it calculated that one in three short-term 
insurance claims contains a fraudulent element. In addition, from an international 
perspective, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) (2013:2) in 2013 estimated 
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losses caused by dishonest claims to be 1.3 billion pounds. At the time, the ABI 
(2013:4) found that in turn, insurers invest approximately 200 million pounds 
annually to identify and investigate fraud.  
 
The Insurance Crime Bureau, originally known as the South African Insurance 
Crime Bureau, was established during 2008 as a sub-committee of the South 
African Insurance Association, with the mandate to investigate syndicated or 
organised crime in the South African short-term insurance industry. Insurance crime 
bureaux world-wide are non-profit organisations, operating by means of fees paid 
by the various member companies. Insurance crime bureaux throughout the 
industry are established as a collaborative effort between insurers or financial 
institutions and law enforcement agencies, to identify, detect and prosecute 
criminals who operate in an industry, e.g. insurance companies or banks.  
 
The establishment of such an umbrella body, focusing on syndicated or organised 
crime, is by no means a unique concept and, according to the Australian Payment 
Forum (2008:3), a number of world-wide industry-specific bodies or forums who 
collaborate are mentioned, and their mandates and the processes and focus areas 
of each described in detail. Such industry-wide bodies mentioned in this White 
Paper include the following in the various countries involved in fraud-prevention and 
investigation initiatives (Australian Payment Forum, 2008:3-13), namely: 
 
 United Kingdom - “CIFAS; Cardwatch; Banksafe Online; Financial Fraud Action 
UK,” and “Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit.” 
 United States - “The Identity Theft Assistance Centre; National Cyber-Forensics 
and Training Alliance; The President’s Task Force on Identity Theft” and the “On-
line Advice and Information Sites.” 
 Ireland - “Irish Fraud Bureau for Economic Crime.” 
 Canada - “Fraud Prevention Forum” and “Interac.” 
 South Africa - “SABRIC.” 
 Australia - “ABA,” “Abacus,” “APCA,” “EPAL,” “Australasion Card Risk Council.” 
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The various card payment initiatives from VISA International and MasterCard, 
based in a number of countries across the globe, are mentioned. Although these 
non-profit industry bodies play a crucial part in assisting their various member 
companies with the investigation and combating of syndicated and organised white-
collar crime operations, their mandate does not include the in-house investigations 
and related preventive initiatives, as in the case of the ICB, therefore it remains the 
responsibility of each South African short-term insurer to ensure that they pay 
dedicated attention to the prevalence of white-collar crime committed by the five (5) 
known perpetrator groups, namely:  
 Policyholders (clients) 
 Suppliers 
 Intermediaries (brokers) 
 No specific relationship (N/R’s) 
 Staff (employees) 
 
and especially to the “insider threat” or staff perpetrator group, and consider the use 
of profiling from both an investigative and proactive preventive perspective. As part 
of addressing and combating the phenomenon of the “insider threat,” more detail is 
provided in paragraph 3.3 of the source of information that could be helpful when 
profiling staff (employees) as potential white-collar crime perpetrators.  
3.3 SOURCES OF INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO PROFILING STAFF 
AS POTENTIAL WHITE- COLLAR CRIME PERPETRATORS 
Golden, Skalak and Clayton (2006:143-144) suggest the following types of 
information sources that may be helpful in addressing the fraud risk that has been 
identified, or highlighting a related fraud risk that may not be known yet. The 
suggested sources include: general press and media reports; specialist industry 
publications or trade journals, analysts’ reports, data mining, and public records. 
Lee (2013:18-22) similarly suggests public records and analyses as potential 
sources that may help to identify fraud or related offenders, sooner rather than later, 
but the author also adds the following additional sources, namely: interviews as part 
of proactive measures, surveillance, and tracking the money trail in order to ensure 
detailed scrutiny of financial transactions.  
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The researcher concurs with the suggestions from Golden, Skalak and Clayton 
(2006:143-144), but in relation to the profiling of staff (employees) as potential white-
collar crime perpetrators, the sources listed below, from an internal (i.e. inside the 
short-term insurer) or external source perspective, may be more applicable to a 
South African short-term insurance scenario: 
3.3.1 Internal 
 Investigation files pertaining to staff investigative matters. 
 Staff (employee) records, usually available from a HR department. 
 Conflict of interest details in respect of external business interests as declared 
by a staff member. 
 Gift register detail - declared detail (giving and receiving) in accordance with 
company policy. 
 Entertainment detail - according to company credit card spending details. 
 Data mining and analysis-related results based on available data from 
departments with an inherent higher fraud risk, or within BU’s. 
3.3.2 External 
 Short-term insurance industry- or financial services-related publications: these 
may provide historic detail about previous positions that an individual was 
employed in. 
 Short-term insurance regulatory body platforms, e.g. FSB in order to easily verify 
FAIS (Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services) qualification and/or FSP 
(Financial Service Provider) number details. 
 Open-source type information: this could include media (online and printed), 
social media, and legal-type information such as previous matters before a court 
of law, the CCMA (Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration) or 
Labour Court, or qualification authority, e.g. SAQA (South African Qualifications 
Authority). 
 Subscription to specific legal-type services, e.g. Legalnet, Sabinet. 
 Subscription to staff-verification service providers, which will include a 
comprehensive check and feedback in regard to credit profile, criminal offences, 
and verification of qualifications obtained. 
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 Public record searches: these types of searches include but are not limited to, 
credit bureaux or property registration details, more generally known as a “deed 
search.” 
 
All these suggested sources of information could firstly be helpful from the 
perspective of proactive handling of misconduct by highlighting the focus areas that 
may have been overlooked until an allegation is received or an actual investigation 
has commenced, and secondly during an investigation of evidence or related proof 
that must be obtained to ensure a successful outcome, i.e. to prove who committed 
the misconduct and how it was carried out. In addition, when results from the above-
mentioned sources are collated into a database and a “linkage analysis” (refer to 
paragraph 3.4 in this research), is applied, the result could eventually prove valuable 
in the discovery of hitherto unknown links between potential perpetrators or their 
modi operandi (MO) used in these cases. With regard to profiling and databases, 
Padgett (2015:67-71) states that although profiling offenders may not be the answer 
to the crime, nor a substitute for conducting investigations, it is a definite potential 
aid when establishing or expanding on “a database for the purpose of crime 
intelligence, which can assist in identifying and tracing offenders.” Padgett 
(2015:69) argues that during an investigation, investigators most often only gather 
various types of information about a perpetrator, and do not spend additional time 
to collate all the various detail obtained in order to compile a “formal offender 
profile.” This subsequently results in vital detail about perpetrators not being used 
or, worse, even overlooked or disregarded. Padgett (2015:70) is of the opinion that 
although investigators may not always necessarily conduct the profiling of white-
collar crime perpetrators themselves, they must at least have a basic understanding 
of the methodology used in profiling. This suggested basic understanding by the 
investigator is required (Padgett, 2015:70) since various profiling techniques and 
related methodologies may influence the crucial data fields required from the actual 
staff investigative files in order to conduct the white-collar crime profiling. In 
reference to the applicability of the use of profiling of white-collar crime perpetrators, 
Perri (2015:3) explains that similar to blue-collar offenders there may indeed be 
white-collar offenders that are repeat offenders or so-called “career criminals.” Perri 
also states that “white-collar offenders display consistent criminal thought patterns, 
attitudes and behavioural traits.” In paragraph 3.4 further focus is directed towards 
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suggested steps and the process when profiling staff (employees) as potential 
white-collar crime perpetrators.  
3.4 STEPS TO FOLLOW WHEN PROFILING STAFF AS POTENTIAL 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME PERPETRATORS  
Employee or internal fraud is defined as the act that is committed against the 
employer, i.e. the company or organisation where the person is employed and 
furthermore, most often to ensure “financial gain” for the individual (Albrecht & 
Zimbelman, 2016:9). These authors elaborate in addition that typical examples of 
employee fraud include “embezzlement, payment, procurement, travel fraud,” as 
well as “exploiting assets or information” (Albrecht & Zimbelman, 2016:11). This 
view (Albrecht & Zimbelman, 2016:9-11) corresponds to the earlier discussions in 
paragraph 2.4.1.2 regarding occupational fraud being defined as “the use of one’s 
occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication 
of the employing organization’s resources or assets” (ACFE, 2012:6). The opinion 
of Albrecht and Zimbelman (2016:9-11) corresponds furthermore to the explanation 
on the “Typology of White Collar Crime” (Edelhertz, 1970:73).  
 
A Harvard Business School study, which collated input from corporate institutions 
around the world, focused on whether there was any difference in “punishment 
severity” meted out to white-collar crime perpetrators, and whether it is depended 
on different management levels and/or the relationship (internal vs external) to the 
specific company (Healey & Serafeim, 2016:16-148). The research conducted by 
Healey and Serafeim subsequently found vast differences between the sanctioning 
of lower-level staff in comparison to that of staff at executive level. These authors 
also found a difference between how male and female staff were treated as 
perpetrators of white-collar crime. Although a number of underlying reasons are 
discussed pertaining to the differentiation in punishment described in the research 
by Healey and Serafeim (2016:16–148), consideration must be given, when profiling 
staff as white-collar crime perpetrators in the South African short-term insurance 
industry, to the fact that there might be slight differences in the associated approach 
and methodology when profiling senior staff and executive management, as well as 
in the case of female offenders. 
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Profiling of general staff as potential white-collar crime perpetrators will be 
discussed in the next section, followed by the suggested process and the difference, 
if any, in the respective criteria, applied when profiling management as potential 
white-collar crime perpetrators in the South African short-term insurance industry. 
3.4.1 The proposed use of a crime-linkage analysis when profiling staff 
as white-collar crime perpetrators 
The suggested application of a crime-linkage analysis in reference to the profiling 
of staff as potential white-collar crime perpetrators in the South African short-term 
insurance industry will be more from a proactive and behavioural angle, rather than 
the outlook that would be applied in the case of more violent crimes. Woodhams 
and Bennell (2015:1) describe the process of “crime linkage analysis” as a “police 
practice whereby crimes that may be the work of the same offender(s) are identified 
from an analysis of crime scene behaviors. The analysis attempts to uncover 
similarities across the potential series that are deemed relatively distinct from 
behavior exhibited in other crimes.” In contrast, Hazelwood and Warren (2003:587) 
state that “linkage analysis” can be described as a process that “integrates the 
information from interrelated aspects of a crime pattern, the MO and signature 
behaviours, committed by a single offender.”  Hazelwood and Warren (2003:588) 
elaborated on the actions that follow the initial evaluation. The suggested actions 
include: 
 
 Gathering the related, detailed documentation. 
 Establishing the most important or noteworthy detail of each crime. 
 Scrutinising each crime in order to understand the various MOs. 
 Establishing or determining whether the same behavioural characteristics can 
be found in the various crimes that were reviewed. 
 Documenting the opinion of the profiler, as well as relevant facts applicable to 
similar MOs, crime or behavioural characteristics, preferably in a written format. 
 
Applying the phenomenon of crime linkage analysis from a South African short-term 
perspective and particularly to staff as potential white-collar perpetrators, the 
researcher knew from experience to scrutinise investigative file notes, analyse 
statements from both witnesses and the perpetrator, as well as liaise with the 
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investigative team as regards significant behavioural traits that were observed but 
ignored at the time, until the official allegation was received and investigation 
conducted. The team responsible for data mining, analytics and intelligence at the 
largest South African short-term insurer and reporting to the researcher officially 
started to compile a list of these behaviours from mid-2012. As new staff related 
matters occurred from 2012 to date, this list was expanded when any additional 
behavioural traits were observed or mentioned, while existing trends that continued 
were indicated as such. The typical behavioural trends, as collated during the period 
2012 to date, and mentioned either in the actual investigative files, whether in the 
investigator notes or witness statements, or alternatively noted by the team 
responsible for data mining, analytics and intelligence include the following: 
 Autocratic management style. 
 Bullying of staff and/or co-workers. 
 Argumentative and defensive when asked for explanations or supporting 
evidence regarding transactions to be processed. 
 Playing down the importance of policies and procedures at the company. 
 Taking short-cuts, either with processes or bypassing control procedures. 
 Demanding the processing of transactions close to the daily payment cut-off 
time, or towards month-end. 
 Working extensive hours’ overtime, but work never seems to be up to date. 
 Carrying large amounts of cash. 
 Alternatively- never has cash and other co-workers must always pay. 
 Meeting with or being visited at the office by dubious individuals. 
 Having a close clique of co-workers and not mingling with the rest of the co-
workers. 
 Having the latest technology gadgets. 
 Living above the income for that specific job grade: examples from the historic 
staff investigative matters include, “overseas holidays, kids in private schools, 
wife underwent a number of cosmetic procedures, neighbourhood they live in, 
often buying new vehicles or driving sponsored vehicles, having the latest 
technology gadgets, including cell phones.” 
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This combined set of behavioural trends has been incorporated into the red-flags 
list in use at the largest South African short-term insurer. Continuous or emerging 
trends are communicated back to the investigation team and thereafter incorporated 
into the fraud risk-management workshops and fraud awareness training presented 
in the company in order to alert co-workers and management to pay more attention 
and report their observations. The reason is that these trends might be potential 
indicators of misconduct being committed, or at the very least, of a staff member 
experiencing increased pressure of some kind, when the situation is evaluated in 
accordance with the fundamentals of “The Fraud Triangle.” As part of this research, 
the importance of red flags is emphasised in paragraph 2.6, while a discussion of 
fraud risk management follows in paragraph 2.6.2.1. Coverage in reference to an 
understanding of the “The Fraud Triangle” and suggested interpretation preceded 
these, and further detail can be found in paragraph 2.5 of this research. The 
researcher agrees with both Woodhams and Bennell (2015:1) and Hazelwood and 
Warren (2003:587-588), since a similar process, excluding a crime scene, is 
followed when profiling employees as potential white-collar crime perpetrators in the 
short-term insurance industry. A further discussion of considerations when profiling 
management as potential white-collar crime offenders follows below. 
3.5 SUGGESTED CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO PROFILING 
MANAGEMENT AS POTENTIAL WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 
PERPETRATORS  
Convicted South African fraudster David Alexander, a previous Managing Director 
(MD) of an insurance broker, who committed fraud to the value of R372 million (De 
Waal, 2009:1), has since his release from prison started a career as a professional 
anti-fraud advisor to safeguard companies from becoming victims of white-collar 
crime. Alexander warns that although it is not always easy to identify a criminal, 
companies should pay closer attention to all the relevant warning signs, and when 
these signs are observed, to act on them sooner rather than later. The suggested 
warning signs to take note of include the following: 
 
 Aggressive management style. 
 Type of “big ego” personality. 
 Inability to admit being wrong. 
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 Individual being observed to be “greedy,” with an insatiable appetite to always 
exceed deliverables or targets, and endlessly boasts about personal 
achievements or wealth. 
 
Alexander furthermore emphasised (in De Waal, 2009:2) that individuals with the 
above-mentioned personal characteristics take pleasure in bypassing controls and 
processes. Once they have contravened the related governance measures or have 
already committed misconduct, they cannot stop, and an almost “adrenaline rush” 
follows, resulting in them convincing themselves that they “have to do it again.” 
Gottschalk (2013:1) is of the opinion that one of the most intricate problems for 
human resource management is “criminal behaviour among executives.” Gottschalk 
(2013:4) continues to elaborate on his concern that white-collar crime research 
often relates to cases of well-known or famed white-collar criminals, and although 
all research is applicable and arouses curiosity, there is a serious need for a “larger 
sample of white-collar criminals that can be studied in terms of averages as variation 
in criminal characteristics.” The researcher is in agreement with Gottschalk (2013:1) 
and, based on personal experience of the “Profile of a Fraudster” (KPMG, 2007:1-
8 & ACFE, 2012:39-50) survey findings, wants to draw attention to the importance 
of the suggested profiling of staff as potential white-collar criminal perpetrators, 
including coverage of all job grades, including senior and executive management.  
 
Deloitte (2015:3) elaborates on the importance of the so-called “tone at the top” 
(TTT) and describes it as the “foundation upon which the culture of an enterprise is 
built,” while the ACFE (ACFE, 2012:1-4) defines this term as “the ethical 
atmosphere that is created in the workplace by the organization’s leadership.” 
Deloitte elaborates that, following the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) by the board of a company, the behaviour of the CEO and how he or she 
connects to people inside and outside the company will set the tone in terms of 
ethics and integrity. Peers and subordinates will be taking clues from this as to how 
to behave, what kind of behaviour will be tolerated or not and whether there is any 
inconsistent behaviour regarding what staff or who is punished or not (Deloitte, 
2015:3-5). It is advised that in order to ensure a sound “tone at the top,” attention 
be paid to all the aspects listed below: 
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 “Walk the talk” always ensure acting in an ethical manner. 
 “Remember the water cooler.” If behaviour displayed was in any manner 
inconsistent with the values of the company, it will be widely discussed by staff. 
 “Keep an ear to the ground.” It is suggested that the leadership uses technology 
in order to be aware of and up to date on what the staff, public, media and other 
stakeholders are saying about your company. 
 “Reward for principled performance” behaviour related to ethics and compliance 
must be included in the performance management details of senior and 
executive management, and it must have a subsequent impact on their 
remuneration. 
 “Build an ethical corporate ladder”. The succession planning and promotion of 
management must include measures related to ethical behaviour and 
compliance, and not only those measures that relate purely to work performance 
or meeting financial targets (Deloitte, 2015:3-5). 
 
When profiling of potential white-collar perpetrators in the South African short-term 
insurance industry pertains to senior and executive management, the presence of 
features such as “narcissism, excessive ambition, aggression, autocratic 
management style and inconsistent behaviour towards staff members must be 
observed closely from a behavioural analysis perspective, since there is a 
phenomenon known as “Snakes in Suits.” This phenomenon refers to when 
psychopaths venture into positions of power in companies (Babiak & Hare, 
2006:95). Babiak and Hare (2006:216-222) further elaborate that when senior and 
executive management is recruited, special attention must be paid to detailed 
background- and reference-checking. In addition, the information presented in a 
curriculum vitae (CV) has to be verified and not merely accepted. Thereafter, once 
all the various checks have been completed, the outcome, together with the results 
of the practice aptitude and psychometric tests, must be collated into an overall 
profile prior to appointment. Babiak and Hare (2006:44-48) describe the process of 
“psychopathic trait identification” and related, distinctive personality characteristics 
so that a potential “Snake in Suit” will be recognised, as being the following 
characteristics: 
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 Superficial charm 
 Lack of remorse 
 Pathological lying 
 Manipulation 
 Irresponsibility 
 Grandiosity 
 Impulsivity 
 
In support of Gottschalk (2013:1) and Babiak and Hare (2006:95), PwC suggests 
that corporations should be on the watch for executives who display the following 
behavioural characteristics, since the latter could be potential red flags to consider 
in a white-collar crime profiling procedure (PwC, 2003:3-4). The suggested 
behavioural characteristics were listed as follows:  
 An individual engaging in continuous activities indicative of a lack of integrity. 
 An individual that is prone to engaging in speculative ventures or 
accept[accepting] unusually high business risks. 
 An individual that exhibit[exhibits] a poor attitude towards compliance with 
regulatory or legislative obligations. 
 An individual that is elusive, unpleasant, rude and abusive to the audit team. 
 Lacks a proven track record between current occupation[occupational] 
responsibilities versus historic work experience. 
 
White-collar crime-specific profiling guidelines vary and although it is difficult to 
include all the characteristics that must be taken into account when conducting 
profiling, Eaton and Korach (2015:3), with specific mention of the ACFE (2014) 
Report to the Nations (2014:59), highlight four (4) characteristics deemed most 
prevalent when a “personality profile of offenders” is compiled. The four (4) 
characteristics to consider are:  
 
 Authority 
 Cultural hedonism 
 Narcissistic personality tendencies 
 Low self-control 
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The researcher continues with a discussion of these four (4) characteristics below, 
since they are applicable to behavioural and unfortunate personality traits displayed 
by staff and management at a company, and have to be considered continuously 
when potential internal white-collar perpetrators are profiled in the South African 
short-term insurance industry.  
 Authority 
With reference to the characteristics of authority, Eaton and Korach (2015:3) 
emphasise the crucial role that the abuse of power, whether for “personal or 
company gain,” plays in the occurrence of white-collar crime. Special mention is 
made of a specific type of authority, namely “charismatic authority.” Eaton and 
Korach (2015:4) warn the profiler not to generalize when the characteristics of 
authority are observed, since they often form part of the typical corporate personality 
that is required, and feature regularly when “rags-to-riches” rise of a successful 
individual in the business world is described. It is, however, important to remember 
that the characteristic of authority can on the flip-side be overindulgent and may 
then require additional focus. Eaton and Korach (2015:6) elaborate further that 
especially from a “charismatic authority” perspective, an example worth mentioning 
is that of Jeff Skilling, former CEO of Enron, to whom the following description 
applied, “too much confidence in authority and one’s own personal successes can 
be dangerous and deplete or even eradicate a business’s control environment.”  
 Cultural hedonism 
This is described by Eaton and Korach (2015:4) as the characteristic attributed to 
“material culture” that the majority of business professionals live by and the aspiring 
way of living that accompanies this. When overpowered by extreme levels of 
“indulgence” and endless “pursuit of accumulated wealth,” this impact is what often 
in the end sets apart the “ethical professionals and white-collar offenders.”  
 Narcissistic personality tendencies 
Certain symptomatic characteristics have to be considered when observing 
“narcissistic personality tendencies,” often referred to officially as “Narcissistic 
Personality Disorder” (NPD), as a contributing factor that increases the likelihood of 
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committing white-collar crime. The characteristics are the following, according to 
Eaton and Korach (2015:5):  
 
 Demands and illusion of grandeur  
 Being an exhibitionist  
 A desperate need for uncritical admiration  
 Entitlement 
 A lack of sustained commitment to others 
 A deficient ability to empathise with others 
 Low self-control 
The authors Eaton and Korach (2015:6) describe the characteristics to be 
considered in connection to behavioural self-control, and the trend that the lower 
this type of self-control, the higher the likelihood of an individual committing white-
collar crime when the opportunity arises or pressure exists. These authors further 
elaborate about this being especially problematic when individuals with the 
tendency to display characteristics related to low self-control are employed in 
positions of trust or higher authority in an organisation. 
 
Eaton and Korach (2015:6-11) elaborate in more detail on additional examples of 
former Enron executives who displayed behavioural and personality with regard to 
the characteristics of authority, cultural hedonism, narcissistic personality 
tendencies, and low self-control. These authors (Eaton & Korach, 2015:6-11) 
continue by describing a number of excessive executive pay scenarios, where the 
above four (4) characteristics played a role to the extent that individuals displaying 
these traits and being appointed as senior management eventually commit 
misconduct. It is furthermore explained by Eaton and Korach (2015:611) how the 
ACFE incorporated the so-called “The Fraud Triangle” (refer to Chapter 2.5), which 
serves as the basis for any “psychological process, with deep roots in sociology as 
well,” into their assessment of red flags from a behavioural perspective.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that all the crucial elements addressed below that 
could be derived from combining the “Profile of a Fraudster,” the “Fraud Prevention 
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Checklist” and “The Fraud Triangle” will ensure a solid foundation for any other 
South African short-term insurer when contemplating the formulation of a white-
collar criminal profiling framework. In the planning of such a framework, to be used 
for profiling perpetrators of white-collar crime in the South African, short-term 
insurance industry, the planner has to firstly take cognisance of the white-collar 
crime profiling guidelines from Eaton and Korach (2015:3-6); secondly, the general 
categories reported on as part of the “Profile of a Fraudster” (KPMG, 2007:1-8) 
(ACFE, 2012:39-50); and thirdly the suggested red-flag criteria formulated by 
Deloitte (2012:11-20) and TEI (2008:3-5). The incorporation of a fraud risk-
management methodology that makes provision for using the “Fraud Prevention 
Checklist” (2012:70) compiled by the ACFE, and applying the fundamental three (3) 
elements of “The Fraud triangle,” together with an investigation methodology that is 
followed in a consistent manner, will further enhance the foundation on which to 
base a white-collar crime-profiling framework.  
 
During analysis of the available parent population of 326 staff investigative matters, 
a smaller number of cases involving senior or executive management were found. 
No specific standard or related data fields were captured in the electronic database 
with reference to any of the related “psychopathic traits” as noted by Babiak and 
Hare (2006:44-48) or the behavioural characteristics described by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2003:3-4). However, when reviewing the actual 
investigative files again, including various statements or notes resulting from 
interviews with witnesses, a number of the above-mentioned behavioural 
characteristics were indeed mentioned. The researcher wants to emphasise that 
extensive focus will still be required in respect of MO as well as similar or relatively 
distinct behaviours. Regarding relatively distinct behaviours to consider when 
profiling staff, there is also the importance of paying attention to drastic changes in 
behaviour. Indicators to consider in this regard are found in examples such as the 
following (Padgett, 2015:49): 
 
 Unexpected, significant purchases: These usually include large assets such as 
a car, house, expensive jewellery or overseas trips. 
 Showing off or boasting about the purchases or the apparent change in lifestyle. 
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 Significant amount of cash being carried around or even handed out, or the 
completely opposite type of behaviour. 
 Increase in personal loans, including “cash loans” or money borrowed from 
colleagues.  
 Increased calls from creditors or visitors demanding payment. 
 Mood swings, e.g. highly irritable or extremely protective of area of responsibility. 
 Refusal to answer questions or being rude when approached for assistance. 
 
These typical, drastic behavioural changes, as described above and when 
observed, must be handled in a similar way as a red flag and, although there may 
be no definite indication of misconduct being committed, the behaviour might 
indicate, for example, increased financial pressure, as described in “The Fraud 
Triangle” (1953:1). The researcher would, however, in light of own experience, not 
ignore such drastic behavioural changes when they are observed or reported since, 
together with information that can be obtained from sources such as discussed in 
paragraph 3.3, these observations may just uncover actual further irregularities. The 
most significant additional factor to consider from a South African short-term 
insurance white-collar criminal profiling perspective will be consideration of the 
characteristics of a fraudster. Additional coverage in this regard follows in paragraph 
3.6. 
3.6 CHARACTERISTICS OF A FRAUDSTER TO CONSIDER WHEN 
CONDUCTING PROFILING 
As stated by Padgett (2015:61), profiling could be described as “collating various 
pieces of information and data or intelligence in reference to a crime or crime 
[criminal] offender.” Due to extensive effort and ensuring that updated surveys are 
issued on either an annual or biannual basis, the various external audit firms, 
together with the ACFE have generated what has become known as the “Profile of 
a Fraudster.” 
 
One of the first dedicated surveys by KPMG with the Profile of a Fraudster (KPMG, 
2007:18) as subject, and based on 360 fraud investigations, found that: 
 
 70% of fraudsters were between the ages of 36 to 55 years 
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 85% of the perpetrators were males 
 50% of the perpetrators had more than 6 (six) years’ service 
 91% of the recorded incidents revealed that the perpetrators committed multiple 
fraudulent acts, over several years, before being exposed 
 49% of the perpetrators admitted that weak internal controls provided them with 
a subsequent opportunity to commit the fraudulent act 
 
This original Profile of a Fraudster survey (KPMG, 2007:1-8) highlighted concerns 
because only 50% of the participant companies at the time communicated anything 
about fraudulent acts to the wider organisation, and a further 15% admit to 
communicating only partial details of fraudulent acts within the wider organisation.  
 
Following on the original Profile of a Fraudster survey (KPMG, 2007:1-8), the ACFE 
released an annual survey report, called the “Report to the Nations” (2012:1), which 
included their findings, specifically about the results of the Profile of a Fraudster. In 
the third consecutive Report to the Nations (2012:39-50), the survey results were 
based on three (3) years of data and the Profile of a Fraudster indicated as follows: 
 
 Age-specific: 54% of the perpetrators were reported to be between the ages 31 
to 45 years.  
 As regards the position of the perpetrator, it was found that fraudulent acts had 
been committed by: 
 Employees – 41,6% 
 Managers – 35,5% 
 Executives or Owners – 17,6% 
 Other – 3,2% 
 From a gender perspective, males committed most of the fraud; in fact, “roughly 
two-thirds”  
 Males – 66,7% 
 Females – 49,9% 
 From a length of service perspective, 42% of the fraudsters had between one 
(1) to five (5) years’ service, while less than 6% committed fraud in their first 
service year. 
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 From an educational angle, 54% of perpetrators had in fact obtained a degree 
or higher. 
 
A concern regarding the findings reported on in the Report to the Nations (ACFE, 
2012:39-50) was that the older the perpetrator, the larger the “median loss” caused, 
and an increased “median loss” was reported when the perpetrator had longer years 
of service or had a higher level of education. The 2012 Report to the Nations (ACFE, 
2012:39-50) survey found that executives or owners “caused losses three times 
higher than managers,” and a similar result was found regarding managers in 
comparison to general employees. If the fraud had been perpetrated by executives 
or owners, it continued for at least two (2) years before it was discovered, and twice 
the length of time for fraudulent acts, committed by general employees being 
discovered. The main reasons provided for this occurrence were the reality that 
there is a general reluctance to report suspicions and observations of wrongdoing 
against individuals in positions of power, and “perpetrators with higher levels of 
authority are typically in a better position to override controls or conceal their 
misconduct” (ACFE, 2012:39-50).  
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in turn released their annual fraud survey during the first 
quarter of 2016, and their findings pertaining to the Profile of a Fraudster were as 
follows (PwC, 2016:13-15). 
 
 45% of financial losses due to economic crime are caused by an internal person 
(i.e. employee) 
 15% of economic crime is perpetrated by senior management at a company 
 
This being the first ever that a decline around this phenomenon was reported, but 
instead it was found that: 
 
 39% of internal economic crime at an organisation is committed by middle-
management 
 the characteristics that can potentially be assigned to the typical internal 
perpetrator were found to be a male person, with some form of tertiary education, 
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between the ages of 31 to 40 years old, and already having been employed at 
the company for 3 to 10 years 
 
The researcher compiled Figure 3.1 below to provide a high-level comparison and 
easier reference to the various “Profile of a Fraudster” survey findings applicable to 
the period 2007 until 2016, and incorporating the detail from the 2007 KPMG survey, 
thereafter the 2012 ACFE survey, and finally the 2016 PwC survey results. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Summary of a comparison of “Profile of a Fraudster” survey results  
(Source: KPMG, 2007; ACFE 2012, PwC 2016) 
 
It has been noted that the various “Profile of a Fraudster” survey findings often 
mention that from a gender perspective, males commit more fraud than females, 
and the findings seldom mention terms such as “pink-collar” fraud. Daly (1989:773) 
formulated five (5) hypotheses about why so little focus is placed on white-collar 
crime being committed by females. His hypotheses are as follows: 
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 The female share of corporate (organizational) crime is very low. 
 The female share of occupational crime is low. 
 A woman is less likely to work in crime groups than a man. 
 A woman’s economic gain from crime is less than a man. 
 Men and women’s motivations for criminal involvement differ. 
 
The researcher found the theory as formulated by Daly (1989:773) to be quite 
stereotypical, against the background of modern corporate life where women these 
days can hold any type of occupation. If applying Daly’s theory (1989:773) to more 
labour intensive type occupations, e.g. engineering, mechanical and construction, 
where female representation across senior and executive management level is still 
limited, his theory is still valid. The researcher, following further analysis of the base 
data set of 326 staff-related investigative matters, covering the period 2003 to 2016, 
and specifically regarding gender, found that, in agreement with the ACFE Report 
to the Nations (2012:39-50), male staff members committed more white-collar crime 
in comparison to female staff (66,4% versus 33,6%), but proportionately, the female 
staff on a case-by-case basis committed white-collar crime with a higher R-value 
that ranges between R808 000 to R4 700 000.  
 
This correlates with the initial exercise attempting to compile a Profile of a Fraudster 
at the largest South African short-term insurer. From an overall organisational 
perspective, there are more female than male staff currently employed at the largest 
South African short-term insurer, but that in itself has not yet impacted on the gender 
outcome, as indicated. Similar findings were reported by Paxton (2016:16-17), who 
first furnished statistics that were released year-on-year by the US Department of 
Justice and indicating an 11% increase in female arrests for embezzlement during 
the period 1990 to 2010. It was furthermore found that female white-collar offenders 
now steal “40 cents to 50 cents of every dollar stolen by a man.” Paxton then 
mentions specific instances where female white-collar criminals stole, amounts 
varying in the lower millions up to $16 million in single instances. Paxton (2016:17) 
concluded at the time that the increase in the number of female offenders could be 
attributed to them being employed in “positions of financial power,” but on the other 
hand, stated that the women committing these type of white-collar offences often 
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did not fit “society’s stereotype of criminals.” Perhaps the “pink-collar criminal is 
often the most trusted long-term employee.”  
3.7 SHORT-TERM INSURANCE WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 
PERPETRATOR SPECIFIC PROFILING GUIDELINES 
Eaton and Korach (2015:2) state that since white-collar crime has become so 
rampant, it is necessary for organisations to start taking note of both the 
criminological and behavioural components that may be present in the actions of 
perpetrators, and it is suggested that these related observations should be collated 
in the form of “criminal” or “offender profiling.” In addition, it is advised by Eaton and 
Korach (2015:2) that components such as “psychological processes, sociological 
environments, personality traits,” as well as “individual characteristics” will have to 
be considered, while detail pertaining to “victimology” and “crime scene analysis” is 
not relevant when profiling perpetrators of white-collar crime.  
 
Profiling guidelines vary, depending on the type of crime that is being investigated, 
and one such suggested guideline is the “Components of Offender Profile,” as 
formulated by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), according to Alison, Smith 
and Morgan (2003:2). This Components of Offender Profile suggests that all the 
following elements be included when conducting offender profiling: 
 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Race 
 Marital status 
 Level of intelligence 
 Sexual adjustments 
 Social adjustments 
 Appearance and grooming 
 Location and residence in relation to crime scene (important for violent crime 
profiling but not so much for insurance cases, except if there is a requirement to 
classify per province or town). 
 Personality/characteristics 
 Evaluation and analysis of the criminal act 
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 Motive for the offence 
 Lifestyle - this includes conducting so-called “lifestyle audits” as a potential 
source of information. The subject remains contentious and must either be 
covered upfront in employee contracts, or instead cleared with unions operating 
in the financial services industry.  
 
Another suggested approach is the “Behavioural-profiling framework” (De Wet, 
2008:57), which in turn suggests that all the following be included instead when 
conducting profiling: 
 
 Offender-specific 
 Population group 
 Gender 
 Age 
 Employment 
 Educational level 
 Criminal history 
 Victim  
 Age 
 Population group 
 Offender relationship 
 Employment 
 Educational level  
 Modus Operandi 
 Method of approach 
 Approach location 
 Violence utilised and methods of control 
 Linkage Analysis applied to all the detail pertaining to offender, victim and MO. 
 
In application of the above, from a South African short-term insurance perspective, 
the researcher would suggest that there is a need for the following specific elements 
to be considered when profiling staff (employees) as potential white-collar crime 
perpetrators, namely: 
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 Age 
 Gender 
 Marital status 
 Location 
 Evaluation and analysis of the criminal act 
 Educational level 
 Criminal history 
 The MO, together with linkage analysis applied 
 
In contrast, the researcher advises that when contemplating a “behavioural profiling 
framework” related to white-collar crime perpetrators in the South African short-term 
industry, to steer clear of categories such as race, population group, and social 
adjustments, since these are all more applicable to violent crimes such as rape or 
profiling of murderers, and there is hardly any need to focus on sexual adjustment, 
appearance and grooming, and violence utilised.  
 
Offender relationship may apply from a South African short-term insurance staff 
(employee) profiling perspective, but must be handled in context, and there will be 
no victim as such, except when there are instances of sexual harassment, but it 
would then be addressed from a misconduct perspective and not related to white-
collar crime offences, which are the focus of this research. 
3.8 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the researcher endeavours to explain the suggested processes and 
guidelines to follow with regard to the research question, namely “which steps 
should be taken to profile employees committing white-collar crime in the short-term 
insurance industry?” An initial overview of the South African short-term insurance 
industry was provided, after which the prevalence of white-collar crime in the South 
African short-term insurance industry was elaborated on. An introductory discussion 
of sources of information to consider when profiling staff as potential white-collar 
criminal perpetrators received attention, as well as the importance of making use of 
crime linkage analysis. Consideration of the profiling of management as potential 
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white-collar crime perpetrators at a company was discussed, as well as the typical 
characteristics to take into account when attempting profiling of white-collar crime 
perpetrators in the South African short-term insurance industry. In the latter part of 
this chapter, the researcher also elaborated on the findings from the various “Profile 
of a Fraudster” surveys, and compiled a high-level combined summary of these 
results.  
 
While legislative and regulatory authorities continued to implement specifications 
and guidelines, and established supervisory watchdogs in order to strengthen 
governance frameworks across the South African short-term insurance industry to 
ensure that policyholders are protected and treated fairly, the occurrence of white-
collar crime continued to escalate. Specifically, from a South African short-term 
insurer perspective, each insurer has to not only remain vigilant, but ensure that all 
acts of misconduct are investigated and sanctions enforced. An efficient fraud risk-
management process must be implemented and the use of all available types of 
proactive measures should be considered in order to counteract the prevalence of 
white-collar crime, from both a transactional and behavioural analysis perspective. 
 
An additional factor to be considered by South African short-term insurers in order 
to protect them from the harm and consequences caused by the various acts of 
misconduct is the impact of having a sound “tone-at-the-top.” The ACFE (2012:1-4) 
defines this term as “the ethical atmosphere that is created in the workplace by the 
organization’s leadership.” This concept followed from the number of catastrophic 
international company failures due to fraud, such as Enron, Tyco and Worldcom, 
and the subsequent 2008 economic crisis. It is believed that if the “tone-at-the-top” 
is sound, the example set by the executive and senior management as to how 
business is conducted, and if policies and procedures are adhered to, will 
subsequently be followed throughout the company, and all lower-level staff will 
strive to display similar behaviour. The opposite is, however, also true and has been 
proved by the large company collapses, for example Leisurenet, Saambou and 
Fidentia. The ACFE (2012:1-4) found that, depending on the “tone-at-the-top,” it 
encouraged or discouraged staff from reporting misconduct or their suspicions, 
based on the following beliefs: 
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 No corrective action will be taken 
 No confidentiality of reports 
 Retaliation by superiors 
 Retaliation by co-workers 
 Unsure whom to contact in order to report suspicions or knowledge of 
misconduct 
 
A sound “tone-at-the-top,” together with applying the best practice when profiling 
staff, including management, as potential white-collar crime perpetrators, and 
collaborating by means of information-sharing by short-term insurers, could only be 
beneficial to the South African insurance industry in combating misconduct. 
 
F Scott Fitzgerald famously wrote:  
 
Let me tell you about the very rich. They are different from you and me. 
Today, a similar point can be made about another group of individuals 
who are much more sinister and even less understood: white-collar 
criminals. It’s not that they simply have (or want) more money — they 
actually think in ways that differ from their more trustworthy peers (Marks, 
2015:1). 
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4. CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The researcher chose to conduct this research to improve the awareness and 
ensure a better understanding of the profiling of white-collar crime perpetrators in 
the short-term insurance industry in South Africa. There are five (5) main categories 
of perpetrators currently defined in the short-term insurance industry namely: 
 
 Policyholders (clients) 
 Suppliers 
 Intermediaries (brokers) 
 No specific relationship (n/r’s) 
 Staff (employees)  
 
It was found that the concept of short-term insurance-related type of fraud dates 
back to 300 before Christ (BC), and the researcher learned that from a South African 
short-term insurance misconduct perspective, the first incident of short-term 
insurance fraud was recorded during the 1950s, and was crop insurance-related. 
 
The aim of this research was to determine how to profile staff who commit white-
collar crime in the South African short-term insurance industry, while the following 
two (2) research questions were defined to assist with accomplishing the aim of this 
research. These questions were: 
 
 What does profiling entail? 
 Which steps should be taken to profile employees committing white-collar crime 
in the short-term insurance industry?  
 
The researcher is confident that the aim as set out for this research has been 
achieved, and that the research questions have been answered.  
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Data for this research was gathered from literature sources, as acknowledged in 
this research, and further emanated from the analysis and interpretation of the 
overall parent population that consisted of 326 concluded staff investigative matters 
at the largest South African short-term insurer during the thirteen-year period from 
2003 to 2016. This research focused on staff as potential white-collar criminals in 
the South African short-term insurance only, and the purpose of the research was 
to contribute to a better understanding of internal white-collar crime perpetrators 
within organisations in the South African short-term insurance industry. It is 
foreseen that this research will present an original contribution to the best practice 
when conducting profiling of white-collar criminals in the short-term insurance 
industry in South Africa.  
 
A qualitative research approach and design were applied throughout this research, 
which was exploratory in nature, and a non-empirical design was applied. Although 
no interviews were conducted or questionnaires circulated, great care was taken to 
ensure adherence to the guidelines pertaining to credibility, transferability, 
dependability and conformability.  
 
The applicable findings as ascertained throughout this research and pertaining to 
the research problem, the aim of the research, the research questions, as well as 
recommendations based on these findings, together with an overall conclusion to 
this research, are discussed below. 
 
4.2 FINDINGS 
The findings that are elaborated on below are based on information obtained from 
literature, both local and international, as well as the perusal, analysis and 
interpretation of the base data set of 326 staff investigative matters during a thirteen-
year period at the largest South African short-term insurer. 
4.2.1 Primary findings 
The primary findings provide answers to the main questions of this research. 
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4.2.1.1 Research question 1: What does profiling entail?  
In reference to this research question, the following was found:  
 
 Criminal profiling is also known as “offender profiling,” “criminal personality 
profiling,” “crime scene profiling,” “criminal investigative analysis,” and in the 
more recent terms of “psychological profiling” and “investigative psychology.”  
 The main objective of profiling will at all times be to perform a structured social 
and psychological assessment of the perpetrator, in particular “investigative 
psychology,” with the objectives’ focus on ensuring sound processes pertaining 
to “data-harvesting, data-driven content analysis, and qualitative structured 
analysis.”  
 When conducting the profiling of potential white-collar criminal perpetrators, 
including in the South African short-term insurance industry, there are specific 
offender characteristics to consider, and detailed data will be required pertaining 
to categories such as age, gender, educational level, marital status, years of 
service at the organisation of employment, job grade in the organisation of 
employment, the type of misconduct, and the average time it took for the 
misconduct to be discovered. 
 During this research it was found that there was a difference of opinion in the 
literature from which data was collected to define white-collar crime in respect of 
the overall categories. In certain instances, it was believed that as few as two 
(2) overall categories were deemed sufficient, with classification focusing on 
whether the white-collar criminal committed the crimes as part of the normal 
execution of his/her daily duties, or outside of his/her normal business 
operations. Other authors, in contrast, were of the opinion that four (4) overall 
categories pertaining to “corruption, fraud, theft and manipulation” were needed 
to define the phenomenon of white-collar crime, while at the largest South 
African short-term insurer it was decided during 2015 to rather use one overall 
defining term, which is “misconduct.” This term, however, includes all the 
following types of white-collar crime offences, namely unethical behaviour, fraud, 
theft, money laundering, corruption and cyber-crime.  
 During this research, it was found that the individuals in the team employed to 
assist with conducting white-collar crime profiling already possessed the 
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required skills and qualities, such as a large amount of energy, a good business 
head and education, an agreeable manner, being obsessive about accuracy and 
exactness, being careful with facts, having an honest character, clever reckoning 
skills, and “an encyclopaedic knowledge.”  
 Incorporating the three (3) fundamentals of “The Fraud Triangle,” namely 
pressure, opportunity and rationalisation, together with the typical red flags, into 
the overall fraud risk-management framework at a South African short-term 
insurer, could assist tremendously when conducting the profiling of potential 
internal white-collar criminal perpetrators, especially from a behavioural 
perspective.  
4.2.1.2 Research question 2: Which steps should be taken to profile 
employees committing white-collar crime in the short-term 
insurance industry?  
In replying to this research question, it was found that the suggested sources of 
information to explore when conducting profiling of potential white-collar criminals 
in the South African short-term insurance industry consist mainly of detail available 
from within the organisation, which may include the following: 
 
 Investigation files related to staff matters. 
 Staff records available from the HR department at a company. 
 Conflict of interest detail expected to be furnished annually by all staff members 
at a company. 
 Details of gift register or entertainment funds spent, required to be submitted by 
staff. 
 Typical sources of information that can be obtained outside an organisation such 
as:  
 General press. 
 Media reports. 
 Specialist industry publications or trade journals. 
 Open-source information, also known as public records, that include detail 
pertaining to court matters, whether criminal or civil, and detail of labour-
related matters. 
 Short-term insurance regulatory body platforms. 
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 Subscription to legal-type services. 
 Subscription to staff-verification services. 
 The use of crime-linkage analysis is crucial when conducting profiling of potential 
white-collar criminals in the South African short-term insurance industry. It is 
advised that data from all the following be collated and integrated in order to 
ensure an effective crime linkage analysis process, namely: Scrutinise 
investigative file notes, analyse witness statements, liaise with the investigative 
team regarding any specific behavioural trends that may have been observed, 
or found to have been a contributing factor to the act of misconduct.  
 When profiling management as potential white-collar criminals in the South 
African short-term insurance industry, additional emphasis should be placed on 
the prevalence of aggressive management style, e.g. “big ego” personalities, 
individuals observed as being “greedy” or not able to admit that they were wrong 
or made mistakes, showing a lack of remorse, known to manipulate staff or co-
workers, being irresponsible or impulsive, or observed as being pathological 
liars. The need for this relates to the phenomenon known as “Snakes in Suits,” 
and also the lessons learned from the collapse of companies such as Enron, 
Worldcom (from an international perspective) and Fidentia (from a South African 
perspective). 
 In reference to the typical characteristics of a potential white-collar criminal in 
the South African short-term insurance industry it was found that the majority of 
perpetrators are men with some form of tertiary education, being employed on 
either middle management or senior management level, and having worked at 
the company for between one (1) to seven (7) years at the time of committing 
the white-collar offence.  
4.2.2 Secondary findings 
The secondary findings do not directly answer the main research questions, but are 
based on significant characteristics that originated from discussions in each 
chapter.  
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4.2.2.1 Criminal versus forensic investigation  
The researcher found that there were differences between the objectives of criminal 
and forensic investigations. The most significant differences relate to the manner in 
which the detail received as part of the allegation is confirmed and established, and 
the possibility that the case may have to be presented to structures other than a 
court of law, such as disciplinary hearings and administrative or civil procedures. A 
different approach is required when collecting evidence in respect of financial 
transactions or financial records, and appropriate, timely actions will be required, 
especially in matters pertaining to the recovery of stolen property or 
misappropriation of assets. 
4.2.2.2 Investigative methodology and the suggested steps to follow  
A forensic investigation, also referred to as an investigative methodology, from a 
South African short-term insurance perspective, most often includes six (6) crucial 
steps. These steps are: 
 
 To receive the allegation through any of a number of reporting channels. 
 The subsequent registration of the investigative matter. 
 Assigning it to an investigator. 
 
Following from these initial three (3) steps, and depending on the outcome of the 
investigation and evidence found: 
 
 Final feedback and recommendations will be made. 
 With these recommendations including advice on further proceedings. 
 Actions pertaining to either a disciplinary hearing, or further action from a civil or 
criminal prosecution perspective.  
4.2.2.3 Integrated framework to combat misconduct  
It was established as part of this research that it is advisable to make use of an 
integrated framework when combating misconduct instead of a single, focused 
emphasis on any or only a few of the following elements: 
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 Deterring unethical behaviour that is often a contributing factor to the eventual 
white-collar criminal act. 
 Preventing misconduct through the implementation of strong governance 
structures, dedicated awareness and continuous training. 
 Ensuring that a robust fraud risk-management process is established. 
 
It is advisable that all allegations received be investigated, and that mechanisms to 
identify and detect white-collar crime are incorporated during the early stages. 
Sanctions resulting from disciplinary hearings and civil or criminal proceedings must 
always be enforced in a consistent manner. 
4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made to ensure improved comprehension and 
recognition of the potential use and subsequent benefits when conducting profiling 
of potential white-collar crime perpetrators in the South African short-term insurance 
industry.  
4.3.1 Recommendation 1 - Research question 1 
What does profiling entail?  
 
It is recommended that a South African short-term insurer ensure that an 
investigative methodology is implemented and, once implemented, adhered to at all 
times, and in the case of exceptions, that the reasons for such exceptions are 
documented prior to conducting profiling of potential white-collar criminal 
perpetrators. The consistent use of an investigative methodology will contribute to: 
 
 Enhancing the required data fields. 
 Ensuring that the data fields needed to conduct profiling are available. 
 Together with the relevant information being captured and completed during 
every staff investigative matter. 
 Ensuring that year-on-year comparisons of all the suggested categories can be 
done. 
 Making sure that any new or emerging trends are noticed immediately. 
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When conducting the profiling of a potential white-collar crime perpetrator it is 
recommended that a formal type of social and psychological assessment be 
completed, and that such an assessment include a behavioural and personality trait 
analysis. Consideration must be given to certain offender characteristics. 
 
A further recommendation pertains to the required, specific data fields that are 
necessary in order to perform the profiling of potential white-collar crime 
perpetrators in the South African short-term insurance industry. 
 
In reference to the employment of individuals to perform the analysis and profiling 
of potential white-collar crime perpetrators, it is recommended that special attention 
be paid during the recruitment stage in order to ensure that the incumbent 
possesses the required skill set and qualities to be a successful profiler. 
 
It is recommended to not only implement a fraud risk-management process, but to 
ensure that an integrated fraud risk framework is established instead that includes 
the incorporation of the three (3) fundamentals of “The Fraud Triangle” as well as 
typical red flags.  
4.3.2 Research question 2 
Which steps should be taken to profile employees committing white-collar crime in 
the short-term insurance industry?  
 
 It is recommended that companies in the South African short-term insurance 
industry, when conducting profiling of potential internal white-collar criminal 
perpetrators, consider the use of a crime linkage analysis, together with data 
collated from all the available internal and external sources of information to 
ensure that the most comprehensive and complete profiling exercise can be 
conducted. At the same time, it should be considered that there has to be a 
difference in the approach when profiling general staff versus from when the 
profiling is focused on management. 
 When profiling management as potential white-collar criminal perpetrators in the 
South African short-term insurance industry it is recommended that continuous 
attention be paid to certain negative personality traits, that the management style 
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be observed, as well as behavioural red flags from a general work perspective, 
such as handling of staff, and their compliance or non-compliance with company 
policies and procedures, or how the lack of such policies is handled. In addition, 
a regular assessment of the so-called “tone at the top” should be carried out. 
4.3.3 Secondary findings: Integrated framework to combat misconduct 
From a secondary findings perspective, it is recommended that in order to 
implement a potentially effective approach to minimise the prevalence of white-
collar crime in the South African short-term insurance industry, an integrated 
approach is necessary. This integrated framework will have to include mechanisms 
to prevent misconduct, such as implementing strong governance structures, con-
tinuous and dedicated awareness and training programmes, together with the 
incorporation of a robust fraud risk-management process. All allegations must be 
investigated while dedicated focus has to be directed towards ensuring that white-
collar crime is detected during the early stages. Once the staff-related investigative 
matter has been completed, all recommended sanctions following from disciplinary 
hearings, civil or criminal proceedings, must be enforced. It is important to ensure 
that where control failures have been identified that may have contributed to the 
opportunity to commit white-collar crime, that these are addressed, and the 
necessary improvements or changes to a specific policy and procedure be made as 
part of the risk-management process, since this will help to prevent similar acts of 
misconduct from happening in future.  
4.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
From the review and detailed analysis of the base data that pertains to a total 
number of 326 completed internal staff investigative matters at the largest South 
African short-term insurer results, covering the period 2003 until 2016, the 
researcher found that results regarding the gender of the internal white-collar crime 
perpetrator indicated that more males than females committed misconduct. The 
results also revealed that although the commission of crime by white-collar female 
perpetrators is less likely, the overall R-value on an individual, actual investigative 
case-by-case basis was higher for female than male white-collar crime perpetrators. 
At this stage, the reasons why female white-collar crime perpetrators in the thirteen-
year period under review committed misconduct with an individual higher R-value 
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are not known yet. Additional research and analysis will have to be conducted in 
order to understand whether there are any underlying causes or logical explanations 
as to why female staff at the largest South African short-term insurer proportionately, 
on a case-by-case basis, committed white-collar crime with a higher R-value than 
their male counterparts.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This research endeavoured to determine the best practice as well as any potential 
pitfalls to consider when profiling staff as potential white-collar criminal perpetrators 
in the South African short-term insurance industry.  
The following two (2) primary research questions were asked: 
 
 What does profiling entail?  
 Which steps should be taken to profile employees committing white-collar crime 
in the short-term insurance industry?  
 
The research design and methodology applied throughout this research enabled 
the researcher to answer the above two (2) research questions. The primary 
findings of the research found that criminal profiling is known under a number of 
different terms, with the most prominent, recent ones being “psychological profiling” 
and “investigative psychology,” while the main objective of profiling is the 
interpretation of the social and psychological assessment of the perpetrator. From 
a South African short-term insurance industry perspective, there are certain 
offender characteristics to consider when conducting the profiling of potential 
internal white-collar criminal perpetrators. It is important to consider the requirement 
for a certain skill set and personality traits when employing staff that will be 
responsible for conducting white-collar crime profiling. From a behavioural profiling 
perspective, it was determined that the three (3) fundamentals of “The Fraud 
Triangle,” namely pressure, opportunity and rationalisation, together with typical red 
flags, must be integrated as part of the overall fraud risk-management framework at 
a South African short-term insurer.  
 
This researcher concluded that when conducting profiling of internal potential white-
collar criminals in the South African short-term insurance industry there are a 
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number of suggested sources of information to consider, with some of the sources 
of data and information being available from within the organisation, while certain 
sources of information may reside external to the South African short-term insurer. 
The relevance of the use of a crime-linkage analysis was another important finding 
from this research, and must be taken into account when profiling of potential white-
collar criminals in the South African short-term insurance industry is conducted. 
Cognisance must be taken of the necessity for additional focus on specific 
behavioural trends when profiling management as potential white-collar criminals in 
the South African short-term insurance industry. This research furthermore 
uncovered that there are typical characteristics of a potential white-collar criminal in 
the South African short-term insurance industry that correspond to survey results 
from the “Big 4” external audit firms as well as industry bodies with regard to the 
“Profile of a Fraudster.”  
 
The secondary findings revealed that there are differences between a criminal 
versus forensic investigation that have to be taken into account, especially when 
the differences relate to the collection of evidence pertaining to financial 
transactions or financial records. Appropriate and timely action will be required, 
especially when there is a need for the recovery of stolen property or to prevent 
misappropriation of assets. An investigative methodology from a South African 
short-term insurance perspective most often includes six (6) crucial steps, and in 
addition, an integrated framework is necessary when attempting to minimise the 
prevalence of white-collar crime. 
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